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I. INTRODUCTION
The common-law jurisprudence created a strict series of categories classifying
persons entering land belonging to another. This comprehensive classification
system was uniformly used in the United States in defining a landowner's' duty to
entrants subsequently injured on the premises by artificial and unreasonably
dangerous conditions.2
The scope of the duty owed by the landowner to the entrant varied depending
on the status accorded the entrant. The three main classes which have developed
are "trespasser," "licensee," and "invitee."3 Within the main classes are other
distinct subclasses including children and others with child-like judgment, often
covered by the jurisprudential exception of "attractive nuisance."4 Other
subclasses include public officers, legal incompetents, 5 and the elderly,6 all of
whom are also protected by similar exceptions judicially created to soften the
effects of the rigid classification system. The distinctions in the three main
classifications are drawn according to whether the entrant's presence was
consensual and/or with proper purpose. It follows that an invitee is owed the
highest duty of care by landowners. The trespasser is owed the least duty of care
because his presence on the premises is not of right. The licensee holds an
intermediate level of protection in the scheme. Notwithstanding exceptions created,
the duty of reasonable care is not owed to any trespasser or licensee under the
common-law classification system. Generally, landowners owed only an invitee
a duty of reasonable care.7 Courts often limited the landowner's duty of reason-
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1. See 62 Am. Jur. 2d Premises Liability § 76 (1990). Here, the term 4, "landowner"
encompasses "property owner," "occupier," and "land possessor." See Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 328E (1965), which defines a possessor of land. Joseph A. Page, The Law of Premises Liability
§ 1.4, at 3 (2d ed. 1988).
2. See 62 Am. Jur. 2d Premises Liability § 303 et seq. (1990); Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 343 (1965).
3. James Farrier, Land Occupier's Liability to Trespassers, 18 La. L. Rev. 716, 716 n.4
(1958); 62 Am. Jur. 2d Premises Liability § 76 (1990).
4. Hunter v. Evergreen Presbyterian Vocational Sch., 338 So. 2d 164, 166 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1976); Bert K. Robinson, Torts-Occupier's Liability to Trespassing Children, 21 La. L. Rev. 853
(1961).
5. See, e.g., Fields v. Senior Citizens Ctr., Inc., 528 So. 2d 573, 582 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988).
6. Garner v. Crawford, 288 So. 2d 886, 888 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973); LaCava v. City of New
Orleans, 159 So. 2d 362, 364 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964); Fields, 528 So. 2d at 581; 65A C.J.S.
Negligence § 141 (1966 & Supp. 1992).
7. Cothern v. LaRocca, 255 La. 673, 686, 232 So. 2d 473, 478 (1970); Carl Hawkins,
Premises Liability After Repudiation of the Status Categories: Allocation of Judge and Jury
Functions, 1981 Utah L. Rev. 15 (1981). "Only the business invitee, whose presence benefits the
owner, has been owed a fully developed duty of reasonable care .. " Id. at 15.
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able care owed to invitees by finding the accident or injury occurred in an area
beyond the invitation extended to the entrant.8
For many years Louisiana courts applied the classification system in premises
actions. It is believed that Louisiana courts resorted to the common-law system
developing in the United States for guidance in handling such tort suits. In Cates
v. Beauregard Electric Cooperative, Inc.,9 the Louisiana Supreme Court abolished
the common-law classification system as the method to be used in defining the
landowner's duty to entrants. No longer would the entrant's status be the
determinative factor in defining the scope and extent of the landowner's duty. The
Cates decision followed a short-lived national trend"0 in adopting the "reasonable
care to all entrants" standard to replace the classification system. This author
believes that the Cates decision was responsible judicial activism, in absence of
legislative action, designed to align Louisiana's premises liability law with the Civil
Code scheme governing tort law in the state.
Despite this alignment, the transition from the classification system to the
"reasonable care" approach has not been without problems. For instance, Louisiana
courts still employ equitable common-law exceptions and doctrines arising under
the classification system. Now, instead of briefly arguing classification, litigants
diffusely argue at length the scope and extent of "reasonable care." The shift also
resulted in the loss of rules of social order formerly supplied by the classification
system. Recent decisions under the "reasonable care" approach permitted
trespasser recovery. Finally, the "reasonable care" approach has caused Louisiana
courts to exercise extreme jury control.
To alleviate these problems, Louisiana courts should consider adopting the
"modified" classification system in premises actions." The "modified" system
differs from the common-law classification system only in that the licensee status
would no longer exist and would be subsumed in the invitee class. This dichotom-
ized system would retain the rules governing the trespasser and invitee classes
along with the special jurisprudential exceptions applied under the common-law
classification system. The claimant's status would be determined by focusing on
whether his presence was "rightful" or "wrongful," considering the foreseeability
of presence. All invitees are owed a duty of reasonable care. Trespassers are owed
no duty of care and are deemed to assume the risks presented by the premises.
This comment provides an overview of the classification system, the duty owed
to members of each class, and the development of the case law involving each
8. The entrant's status would change based on his location on the property. See W. Page
Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 61, at 424-25 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988).
9. Cates v. Beauregard Elec. Coop., Inc., 328 So. 2d 367 (La.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833,
97 S. Ct. 97 (1976).
10. See Keeton et al., supra note 8, § 62, at 432-34. See also infra note 144.
11. States using the modified classification system include Connecticut; Florida, Illinois, Maine,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Dakota, and Wisconsin. Two of these states effected this
intermediate position by legislative action. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-557(a) (West 1991); III. Ann.
Stat. ch. 740, 1 130/1 et seq. (Smith-Hurd 1993). See infra notes 144-153.
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class. This discussion is a necessary preface for further examination of the
development of premises liability law in Louisiana in the post-Cates era.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE CLASSES OF ENTRANTS
A. Trespassers
A trespasser is defined as one "who enters or remains upon land in the
possession of another without a privilege 2 to do so created by the possessor's
consent or otherwise."' 3 Trespassers must take the premises as they find them. 4
Trespassers assume the risks of danger on the premises, and landowners are not
liable for any failure to exercise reasonable care that results in physical harm to
trespassers. 5
For many years, "[t]he landowner's established position of importance and his
interest in the free and unrestricted use of his property overrode the value placed
upon the trespasser's interest in physical safety."' 6 The special privileges afforded
the landowner may be traced to ideals of dominance and prestige originating in the
landowning classes in England during the common-law formation periods. 7
Although the general rule prevailed that no duty of care was owed a trespasser,
some exceptions evolved."
First, when the landowner has reason to know of constant or frequent
trespasses on a particular part of his property and tolerates such acts, courts have
tended to treat the trespasser as a licensee and have required the landowner to
exercise reasonable care to make the premises safe, to warn of hidden and potential
dangers, and to refrain from unreasonably dangerous activities in the entrant's
proximity.' 9 The burden of preventing harm becomes less as the foreseeability of
danger to a potential trespasser increases. Following this analysis, courts began to
12. Unusual circumstances and exigencies may give rise to privileges. See Restatement
(Second) of Torts §§ 191-211, 329 cmt. a (1965).
13. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 329 (1965); see also Friedman's Estate v. Texas & Pac.
Ry. Co., 209 La. 540, 548, 25 So. 2d 88, 91 (1946); Alexander v. General Accident Fire & Life
Assurance Corp., 98 So. 2d 730, 731 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
14. Keeton et al., supra note 8, § 58, at 393; Lynch v. American Brewing Co., 127 La. 848,
850, 54 So. 123, 124 (1911).
15. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 333 (1965). See supra note 14. Bauman v. Beaujean, 53
Cal. Rptr. 55, 58 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (quoting 35 Cal. Jur. 2d, Negligence § 97, at 606-07).
16. Farrier, supra note 3, at 717; William L. Prosser, Law of Torts § 76 (2d ed. 1955).
17. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630, 79 S. Ct. 406, 410
(1959); Fontenot v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 227 La. 866, 80 So. 2d 845, 848 (1955).
18. Farrier, supra note 3, at 718.
19. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 333, 334, 337 (1965). Farrier, supra note 3. at 720, 723:
McGuire v. Vicksburg S. & P. R. Co., 46 La. Ann. 1543, 1552, 16 So. 457, 462 (1894) (activities
on premises); Doyle v. Thompson, 50 So. 2d 505, 508-09 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1951) (quoting 65 C.J.S.
Negligence § 24 (activities on premises)); Taylor v. Baton Rouge Sash & Door Works, 68 So. 2d
159, 161-62 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1953) (condition on premises); Mills v. Heidingsfield, 192 So. 786,
789 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939) (condition on premises).
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impose a limited "duty of reasonable care to discover [such dangers] and protect
[trespassers] .. . ."' Some early cases calling for judicial attention involved the
well-traveled pathways across or along railroad tracks.2' Rather than creating an
exception to the trespasser laws, some courts chose to use an "implied permission"
theory to label the entrant a "licensee." 22
The second exception includes cases where the landowner has knowledge that
a particular person has trespassed, even once, on his property. In such a case he
may owe that person a duty of reasonable care.23 The exception imposing a duty
on the landowner applies when the landowner, of his own volition, creates a
controllable hazard24 as well as when the hazardous condition occurs naturally, at
least in theory.25 Even under the classification system, a landowner cannot
intentionally or willfully injure a trespasser, licensee, or invitee.26 Some courts
have required at least a "willful or wanton" level of disregard to hold the landowner
liable27 for injuries to a trespasser. A landowner may be able to satisfy his limited
burden of due care by warning the trespasser of the danger.28 If it is possible that
the trespasser will disregard the warning, then the landowner must take other steps
to avoid harm to the trespasser.
20. Keeton et al., supra note 8, § 58, at 396.
21. The first decision to impose liability upon a landowner in this setting was Sioux City &
P. Ry. Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657 (1873). See also Schexnaydre v. Texas & P. Ry. Co.,
46 La. Ann. 248, 14 So. 513 (1894); Nave v. Alabama G.S.R. Co.. 11 So. 391, 392 (Ala. 1892). The
very first reported decision in the common law in this area is believed to be Lynch v. Nurdin, I Q.B.
29, 41 E.C.L. 422, 113 Reprint 1041, noted in Peters v. Town of Ruston, 167 So. 491,492 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1936).
22. Alexander v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 98 So. 2d 730, 732 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1957); Payton v. St. John, 188 So. 2d 647, 650 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966). The first Louisiana
case to acknowledge "implied permission" as a basis tor "licensee" status was Ingram v. Kansas City,
S. & G. Ry. Co., 134 La. 377, 381, 64 So. 146, 147 (1914). "Permission may be implied when the
owner has actual knowledge of the entrant's presence and fails to object." Page, supra note 1, § 3.3,
at 36.
23. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 335, 336 (1965). Farrier, supra note 3, at 722; Cannon
v. Mengal, 8 La. App. 375 (1928); Friedman's Estate v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 209 La. 540, 548, 25
So. 2d 88, 91 (1946). Page, supra note 1, §§ 2.5, 2.6, at 13-15.
24. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 338 (1965).
25. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 337 (1965); Loney v. McPhillips, 521 P.2d 340, 344 (Or.
1974). However, the Loney decision holds that the "attractive nuisance" exception does not apply
when natural conditions are the alluring land feature.
26. United Zinc & Chem. Co. v. Britt, 258 U.S. 268, 275, 42 S. Ct. 299, 299-300 (1922); Cates
v. Beauregard Elec. Coop., Inc., 316 So. 2d 907, 917 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975), affd, 328 So. 2d 367,
cert. dehied, 429 U.S. 833, 97 S. Ct. 97 (1976) (Landowner "cannot deliberately set out traps or
spring guns for trespassers who might come on the premises."); Bourg v. Redden, 351 So. 2d 1300,
1302 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977) (landowner snares motorcyclists by placing steel cable across access
road); Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971).
27. See Keeton et al., supra note 8. § 58, at 397 n.49; Cates, 328 So. 2d at 370; Alexander v.
General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 98 So. 2d 730 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1957).
28. Objective conditions must prove that the landowner reasonably believes the trespasser will
see and heed the well-placed warning.
NOTES
Another exception dubbed the "turntable" doctrine or the "attractive nuisance"
doctrine was jurisprudentially created with regard to trespassing children. 29 The
court in Hunter v. Evergreen Presbyterian Vocational School"0 defined the
"attractive nuisance" doctrine as "nothing more than nomenclature given to a
determination that a defendant has breached its duty of reasonable care for the
safety of others by maintaining on its premises an unreasonable and foreseeable
hazard to children or others with childlike judgment." The "attractive nuisance"
doctrine is not confined to cases where the entrant is a trespasser. It applies equally
to cases involving licensees."
Courts often found it necessary to soften the effects of the classification system
when a child was injured. A child of tender years is unable, or less able, to
appreciate the risks created on another's land.32 Further, children trespass more
frequently than adults due to mere curiosity. For these reasons danger to children
is more easily foreseeable.3 a
[N]ot every instrument possibly dangerous to a child of tender years, or
which such a child might convert into a means of amusement, constitutes
an attractive nuisance. On the contrary, for the attractive nuisance rule to
apply, the instrumentality or [land] condition must be of a nature likely to
incite the curiosity of a child and [be] fraught with such danger as to
reasonably require precaution to prevent children from making improper
use thereof-4
The "attractive nuisance" doctrine has imposed liability on landowners
maintaining conditions on their land which are alluring and harmful to children.
Requirements for application of the "attractive nuisance" doctrine are: (1) the
29. United Zinc, 258 U.S. at 275-76, 42 S. Ct. at 299-300 (First time United States Supreme
Court adopted "attractive nuisance" doctrine); Saxton v. Plum Orchards, 215 La. 378, 387-88, 40 So.
2d 791, 795 (1949). Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339 (1965); Page, supra note I, §§ 2.8, 2.9,
2.10, 2.11, 2.12, 2.13, at 16-32. This author notes that Louisiana courts continue to use the
"attractive nuisance" exception to afford children a "super-plaintiff" position insuring full recovery.
Comparative fault principles have not been discussed in these decisions. This author believes that
comparative causation might be applied with success. See, e.g., Simmons v. Whittington, 444 So.
2d 1357, 1360 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 447 So. 2d 1071 (1984); Batiste v. Boh Bros. Constr.
Co., 404 So. 2d 1348, 1350 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981); Carter v. Salter, 351 So. 2d 312, 314-15 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1977), overruled by Lewis v. Till, 395 So. 2d 737 (La. 1981). See also infra note 40.
30. 338 So. 2d 164, 166 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
31. Patterson v. Recreation and Park Comm'n, 226 So. 2d 211,215-16 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ
refused, 254 La. 925, 228 So. 2d 483 (1969). It need not be applied to an invitee-child as he already
attains greater rights based on his classification as an invitee.
32. Saxton, 215 La. at 388, 40 So. 2d at 795; Thompson v. Ewin, 457 So. 2d 303, 307 (La.
App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 460 So. 2d 1043 (1984); Richards v. Marlow, 347 So. 2d 281, 283 (La.
App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 350 So. 2d 676 (1977).
33. Herbert v. City of Kenner, 501 So. 2d 901, 905-06 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1987) (citing
Patterson, 226 So. 2d at 216; Rolen v. Maryland Casualty Co., 240 So. 2d 42, 46 (La. App. 2d Cir.)),
writ denied, 256 La. 1149, 241 So. 2d 252 (1970).
34. Patterson, 226 So. 2d at 216.
1993] 1939
1940 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53
landowner knew the hazard was located on his property in an area where children
were likely to trespass; (2) the landowner knew the risk and should have known or
realized that it posed an unreasonable risk of harm to children; (3) the benefit of
maintaining the hazard and the burden of eliminating the danger must be
significantly outweighed by the risk of harm to children; and (4) the landowner
must fail to use reasonable care to eliminate the foreseeable danger or protect the
children.35
Cases in this area have involved countless different land conditions, objects
and activities.36 Many of the cases involved land conditions and objects which a
child mentally associated with a "plaything."" Animals have always been
alluring to children though few courts have been willing to stretch the "artificial
condition" requirement to allow recovery under the doctrine.3"
Courts have allowed the "assumption of the risk" and "contributory negli-
gence" defenses when the injured child discovered and realized the danger and then
decided to encounter it.39 Nonetheless, when a court applies the "attractive
35. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339 (1965). See also lbieta v. Phoenix of Hartford Ins.
Co., 267 So. 2d 748, 749 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972); Saxton. 215 La. at 388, 40 So. 2d at 795; Peters
v. Town of Ruston, 167 So. 491,492 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1936). Another requirement of the "attractive
nuisance" doctrine which is often used as a defense is that the "attraction itself must contain the
danger" which the victim encountered. Johnson v. NOPSI, 291 So. 2d 813,816 (La. App. 4th Cir.),
writ denied, 293 So. 2d 493 (1974); Patterson, 226 So. 2d at 216; Compagno v. Monson, 580 So.
2d 962, 966 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1991).
36. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 339 (Appendix) (1986); Keeton et al., supra note 8,
§ 59, at 399-411.
37. Examples include construction pipes, swimming pools, tree houses, open fires, and railroad
turntables. Richards v. Marlow, 347 So. 2d 281 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 350 So. 2d 676
(1977) (child slipped from substructure of fishing pier); Scott v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 195 So. 2d
353, 355 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967) (construction materials and drainage pipe held not to be an
attractive nuisance); Simmons v. Whittington, 444 So. 2d 1357, 1360 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied,
447 So. 2d 1071 (1984) (a swimming pool is an attractive nuisance); Thompson v. Ewin, 457 So.
2d 303, 307 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 460 So. 2d 1043 (1984) (a swimming pool is not an
attractive nuisance when shielded from public view and child old enough to appreciate the danger
of drowning); Garison v. Wells, 262 So. 2d 820, 823 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972) (treehouse with ladder
is an attractive nuisance); Hunt v. Rundle, 120 So. 696, 698 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1929) (gasoline fire).
See also 27 A.L.R.2d 1187 (fire as an attractive nuisance). See supra note 21 for railroad "turntable"
cases.
38. Hofer v. Meyer, 295 N.W.2d 333, 336-37 (S.D. 1980) (horse as an artificial condition).
Some courts, as in Hofer, have labeled animals as "artificial" conditions to allow recovery. However,
other courts have refused to hold that an animal could be an artificial condition. Hall v. Edlefson,
498 S.W.2d 514, 516 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); Gonzales v. Wilkinson, 227 N.W.2d 907, 909-10 (Wis.
1975). Louisiana courts have yet to answer this issue; however, in Rolen v. Maryland Casualty Co.,
240 So. 2d 42, 46 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ refused, 256 La. 1149, 241 So. 2d 252 (1970), the court
found the "attractive nuisance" doctrine did not apply to a child lured to the neighbor's yard by their
dog, and subsequently bitten, because everyone believed the dog was gentle and playful. Thus, the
animal was not a dangerous condition. The court in Betbeze v. Cherokee Nat'l Ins. Co., 345 So. 2d
577, 579 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 349 So. 2d 329 (1977). discussed the unique attraction a
child has to a dog. In Compagno v. Monson, 580 So. 2d 962, 966-67 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1991), the
court held that a doghouse was not an attractive nuisance.
39. Richards, 347 So. 2d at 283-84; Juhas v. American Casualty Co.. 140 So. 2d 676. 679 (La.
NOTES
nuisance" doctrine, it appears that the plaintiff recovers all damages without any
assessment of contributory or comparative fault.4°
The "attractive nuisance" doctrine must "be accorded limited application and
employed only with caution."' A "tremendous burden [is] placed on the property
owner when the principle of attractive nuisance is held applicable.""
Louisiana jurisprudence prior to the Cates decision is replete with cases
applying the trespasser status. 43 Courts have strictly scrutinized claims presented
by persons injured while traversing a place they had no right to be. Public policy
seeks to insure that business proprietors and landowners will not become insurers
of the safety of transient or criminal individuals who happen upon their land.
B. Licensees
A licensee is one who goes on the land of another with the consent4 4 of the
landowner, by authority of law,45 or as necessary.46 Some courts divide licensees
App. 4th Cir. 1962). However, concerning elderly or infirm persons, note the decision in Guillotte
v. Houston Gen. Ins. Co., 368 So. 2d 1026 (La. 1979). The "contributory negligence" and
"assumption of the risk" defenses have been replaced by "comparative fault." La. Civ. Code an.
2323; Turner v. NOPSI, 476 So. 2d 800, 804 (La. 1985) (contributory negligence is no longer a
complete bar to recovery); Murray v. Ramada Inns, 521 So. 2d 1123 (La. 1988) ("assumption of the
risk" is abolished in Louisiana strict liability actions). It is unclear whether comparative fault
principles will be applied when the "attractive nuisance" doctrine is employed. See supra note 29.
See also infra note 40.
40. Between 1980 and 1992, there appear to have been only five appellate court decisions
upholding the trial court's application of the "attractive nuisance" doctrine. In each decision the
plaintiff recovered in full. See Melerine v. State, 505 So. 2d 79 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 507
So. 2d 226 (1987); Fusilier v. Northbrook Excess & Surplus Ins. Co., 471 So. 2d 761 (La. App. 3d
Cir.), writ denied, 472 So. 2d 918 (1985); Simmons, 444 So. 2d at 1357; Ryals v. Home Ins. Co., 410
So. 2d 827 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 414 So. 2d 375, writ denied, 414 So. 2d 376 (1982);
Batiste v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 404 So. 2d 1348 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981). Each of these courts
failed to address the issue of whether comparative fault can be applied once the "attractive nuisance"
doctrine is used. Since comparative fault principles apply to strict liability actions, per the decision
in Landry v. State, 495 So. 2d 1284, 1290 (La. 1986). the relevant inquiry may be whether the
"attractive nuisance" doctrine is in the nature of strict liability or absolute liability.
41. Patterson v. Recreation and Park Comm'n, 226 So. 2d 211, 216 (La. App. Ist Cir.), writ
refused, 254 La. 925, 228 So. 2d 483 (1969); Beasley v. Guerriero, 123 So. 2d 774, 778 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1960).
42. Patterson, 226 So. 2d at 216. See also Martin v. Sessum Serv. Corp., 174 So. 2d 180, 182
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
43. See, e.g., Friedman's Estate v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 25 So. 2d 88, 209 La. 540 (1946);
Cothern v. La Rocca, 221 So. 2d 836 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 255 La. 673,
232 So. 2d 473 (1970).
44. A "license" may be given by words, either written or spoken, or by other acts which
manifest consent. Mills v. Heidingsfield, 192 So. 786, 789 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939) ("license"
distinguished from "invitation"); Mercer v. Tremont & G. Ry. Co., 19 So. 2d 270, 275 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1944) (consent may arise from custom, usages in the community, or prior dealings).
45. Savell v. Foster. 149 So. 2d 210, 212 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ refused, 244 La. 148, 150
So. 2d 769 (1963).
46. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 345 (1965); Alexander v. General Accident Fire &
1993]
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into two types: (1) a "bare" licensee and (2) a licensee by invitation or social
guest.47 The licensee's presence is consensual, but he does not have a business
purpose for being on the land nor any other right apart from the landowner's admit-
tance.48 Incidental business motives behind an invitation, or incidental services
performed by a social guest, do not transform a licensee into an invitee.49
Obviously the landowner owes a higher duty of care to a licensee than to a
trespasser.50 Social guests are deemed "licensees" although they are "invited" by
the landowner.5' With limited additional protection, a licensee must take the
premises as he finds them.52 The only real obligation of the landowner is to
refrain from injuring the licensee willfully, wantonly, or through "active negli-
gence."53 Nonetheless, the landowner must warn the licensee of latent dangers
within the landowner's actual knowledge.5 4 Some courts have afforded social
guests the status of invitee and have refused to allow the landowner any greater
protection from liability with regard to them.5"
Although social guests do not become invitees by gratuitously performing
services,56 this result may differ if the sole reason for the guest's presence is to
Life Assurance Corp., 98 So. 2d 730, 732 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957); Barrilleaux v. Noble Drilling
Corp., 160 So. 2d 319, 322 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964). See also West v. Faurbo, 384 N.E.2d 457, 458
(111. App. Ct. 1978) (child who swerved bicycle onto landowner's property to avoid reckless car is
a licensee due to privilege of "private necessity").
47. Cothern v. LaRocca, 221 So. 2d 836, 840 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969), rev'd on other grounds,
255 La. 673, 232 So. 2d 473 (1970); Payton v. St. John, 188 So. 2d 647, 650 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1966). Louisiana courts, prior to Cates, did not favor use of the "licensee" status. Few decisions
involve this intermediate status.
48. Potter v. Board of Comm'rs, 148 So. 2d 439, 440 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963); Payton v. St.
John, 188 So. 2d 647, 650 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966). See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 330
(1965).
49. Gudwin v. Gudwin, 14 Conn. Supp. 147 (1946) (transporting host); Pinson v. Barlow, 209
So. 2d 722, 724 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968), overruled by Hix v. Billen, 284 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1973)
(cooking with host); McHenry v. Howells, 272 P.2d 210, 213 (Or. 1954) (ironing clothes for host);
Page, supra note 1, § 3.21, at 62.
50. Cothern, 221 So. 2d at 840 (licensee is owed same duties as a trespasser and, also, a duty
of warning of latent premises dangers if land occupier actually knows of the danger); Doyle v.
Thompson, 50 So. 2d 505, 508 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1951).
51. Natal v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 305 So. 2d 438, 440 (La. 1974); Millet v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
319 So. 2d 803, 805 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
52. Potter v. Board of Comm'rs, 148 So. 2d 439, 440 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
53. Johnson v. Ruben, 222 So. 2d 617, 619 (La. App. 2d Cir.), application denied, 254 La. 758,
226 So. 2d 522 (1969); Wannage v. Marcantel, 176 So. 2d 5, 7 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965). Earlier
restrictive decisions exist: Mercer v. Tremont & G. Ry. Co., 19 So. 2d 270, 274 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1944); Mills v. Heidingsfield, 192 So. 786, 789 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939).
54. Melancon v. Zoar Missionary Baptist Church, 222 So. 2d 308, 310-11 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1969); Savell v. Foster, 149 So. 2d 210, 212 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
55. One such decision is found in Daire v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., 143 So.
2d 389, 392 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962). The Court stated "a social guest is ... an invitee." Many
Louisiana courts chose to stretch their factual findings to afford "social guests" the status of invitee
rather than making the wholesale shift in the group's status, as in Daire.
56. Drews v. Mason, 172 N.E.2d 383, 387-88 (II1. App. Ct. 1961); Downey v. Lackey, 466
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perform services.57 When the landowner receives economic benefit, some courts
have applied the invitee status to the "guest."5 8 Since many scenarios may arise,
borderline cases as to an entrant's status must be resolved by the trier of fact.59
C. Invitees
The invitee is afforded the most protection by the common-law classification
system. 60 Broadly, an invitee is defined as a person entering the property of
another with the landowner's consent for some purpose connected with the use of
the premises. 6' Louisiana law developed two types of invitees: 62 "social
guests, 63 and "business visitors. '64 A landowner owes the invitee a duty of
reasonable care to inspect the premises, find hidden dangers, and warn of or remedy
them. 5 The jurisprudence has been inconsistent in determining which claimants
P.2d 401, 403 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970); Pearlstein v. Leeds, 145 A.2d 650 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 1958),
cert. denied, 149 A.2d 303 (1959); Benedict v. Podwats, 271 A.2d 417, 419-20 (N.J. 1970). See
supra note 49.
57. LaBranche v. Johnson, 193 S.E.2d 228, 229-30 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972). Even in more
conservative courts, the court may find plaintiff to be an invitee, as a matter of law, if the benefit
conferred upon the land occupier is substantial. Sills v. Forbes, 91 P.2d 246, 250 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1939).
58. Mercer v. Tremont & G. Ry. Co., 19 So. 2d 270, 275 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1944). The Court
in Champagne v. Northern Assurance Co., 210 So. 2d 68, 69 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ refused, 252
La. 831, 214 So. 2d 159 (1968), labeled the claimant an invitee even though there was no economic
benefit to the landowner. See also Page, supra note I, § 3.21, at 62.
59. Middleton v. Consolidated Underwriters. 185 So. 2d 307, 310 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966);
Drews, 172 N.E.2d at 387; Harper v. Kuntz, 485 P.2d 190, 193 (Kan. 1971).
60. Cothern v. LaRocca, 255 La. 673, 686, 232 So. 2d 473, 477-78 (1970) (land occupier only
owes invitees the limited duty of reasonable care). J.A. Tarantino & M.A. Dombroff, Premises
Security: Law and Practice §§ 1.3, 1.4, at 3 (1990).
61. There is authority for labeling a "social guest," absent a business purpose, an "invitee."
Daire v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., 143 So. 2d 389, 392 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962);
Alexander v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 98 So. 2d 730, 732-34 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1957); Crittenden v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 83 So. 2d 538, 540 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1955). But
see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 332 cmt. a (1965).
62. Other states developed a third type of invitee, the "public invitee." See. e.g., Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Johnson, 91 F.2d 332, 339 (10th Cir. 1937); Wiley v. National Garages. Inc., 488
N.E.2d 915, 919 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984). "A public invitee is a person who is invited to enter or
remain on land as a member of the public for a purpose for which the land is held open to the
public." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 332(2) (1965).
63. Flettrich v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 238 So. 2d 220, 222 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
See also supra note 61.
64. "A business visitor is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land for a purpose
directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the possessor of the land." Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 332(3) (1965). See also Lee v. Vidrine, 316 So. 2d 402, 403-04 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1975); Saveli v. Foster, 149 So. 2d 210, 212 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963). This includes persons on
the premises for the purpose of potential or future dealings. Also included are present persons
necessary for the convenience of others on the land for a business purpose.
65. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 341A, 343 (1965); Foggin v. General Guar. Ins. Co., 250
La. 347, 362-63, 195 So. 2d 636, 641 (1967).
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met the burden of proving a "purpose" sufficient to be deemed an invitee.
Nevertheless, liability is proper because invitees have reasonable expectations that
the landowner's premises were made safe for them.66
In limiting the "business visitor" branch of the invitee class, courts tend to rule
that if the visitor reasonably believes 67 that the premises have been held open to
him for the particular purpose for which he entered, then he is a "business
visitor."'6 Courts do not require the claimant to be engaged in "business activity"
when injured, as long as he has a general business relationship with the land-
owner.6
If the invitee travels into areas of the premises beyond his invitation," then
his status may be reduced to licensee or even trespasser. 7 ' The extended invitation
may be expressly or impliedly limited as to purpose, duration, or the portion of the
premises accessible. 72 The scope of the invitation must be properly determined
in terms of time and space based on the reasonable expectations of the injured
party. The landowner's hidden intentions do not affect the injured party's legal
status.73
Courts have set general guidelines for what constitutes "reasonable care" owed
by landowners to invitees under different factual scenarios. 74 Basically, the
landowner cannot subject his invitee to "unreasonable risks of harm." The
66. Home Ins. Co. v. Spears, 590 S.W.2d 71, 73 (Ark. Ct. App. 1979). The reasonableness of
such an "expectation" varies with the scope of the invitation and/or purpose for the entrant's
presence.
67. The "reasonable man" standard is applied in deciding whether the entrant's expectation of
implied invitation was sufficient to deem him an invitee or licensee. Terpstra v. Soiltest, Inc., 218
N.W.2d 129, 131 (Wis. 1974).
68. Restatement (Second) of Tons § 332, cmt. b (1965).
69. Campbell v. Weathers, Ill P.2d 72, 75-76 (Kan. 1941); David W. Robertson. Torts, 23 La.
L. Rev. 281, 296 (1963).
70. Benjamin F. Day, Invitee Status in Louisiana, 27 La. L. Rev. 796, 803-04 (1967). See also
Cates v. Beauregard Elec. Coop., Inc., 316 So. 2d 907, 911-13 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975), aff'd, 328
So. 2d 367, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833, 97 S. Ct. 97 (1976); Clement v. Bohning, 159 So. 2d 495,
497 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963). See also supra note 8.
71. Cates, 316 So. 2d at 911 ("[A~n invitee or licensee loses [his] status when he goes outside
the portion of the premises covered by the invitation or permission."); Clement, 159 So. 2d at 497
(storekeeper's duty to invitee is reduced when the patron, without invitation, wanders into portions
of the premises not customarily open to the public); Page, supra note 1, § 3.5, at 39-40.
72. Id.
73. Wiley v. National Garages, Inc., 488 N.E.2d 915, 919 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
74. A landowner is not the insurer of his invitee's safety and is not obliged to protect him from
every potential hazard; however, he owes the invitee a "duty of exercising ordinary and reasonable
care for his safety commensurate with the nature of the premises, the use envisioned by the invitation
to enter and the particular circumstances [surrounding the entrant's existence on the premises]."
Leger v. Employers Liab. Ins. Corp.. 276 So. 2d 759, 762 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973) (quoting Kennedy
v. Columbia Casualty Co., 174 So. 2d 869, 874 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965)); Melton v. Mire, 268 So.
2d 123, 125-26 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972) (quoting Kennedy, 174 So. 2d at 874).
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landowner has an affirmative duty to use reasonable care to inspect the premises
and to remedy latent defects.75
The duty of "reasonable care" varies according to the established use of the
premises.76 Circumstances permitting, the landowner may fulfill his obligation
by merely warning the entrant. The warning must raise the invitee's awareness to
a level enabling him to protect himself. But there are situations when a warning,
no matter how fitting, will not suffice to protect the invitee.7 In such cases, the
landowner must act to remedy the defect.
Although a particular danger is "open and obvious" to the invitee, if no
warning is given by the landowner, reasonable steps must be taken to protect the
entrant if it should be reasonably anticipated that harm will occur despite the
obviousness of the danger." This is the modern view overshadowing the historic
notion of non-liability if the danger is "open and obvious." The modern view treats
"obviousness of the danger" as one factor bearing on whether the landowner is
negligent or whether the invitee was comparatively at fault. Thus, it is no longer
a "per se" duty limitation. The landowner does have a duty to correct the danger
79regardless of the invitee's potential awareness.
The landowner's duty of care also extends to risks posed by third persons who
enter his premises while an invitee is present.80 Often, third party entrants of
various types,8" including criminals, 8 2 cause injury to invitees. The landowner's
liability arises when he knows or reasonably should anticipate that danger may
confront his invitee.83 A majority of courts have held that the landowner is not
required to act unreasonably or risk his life to protect the invitee. 4 The landowner
must only "act reasonably to prevent such attacks and protect patrons from harm.
75. Day, supra note 70, at 797 n.6; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 (1965).
76. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 cmt. e (1965).
77. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A cmts., ill. 2 (1965).
78. Day, supra note 70; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A(i) (1965).
79. Day, supra note 70; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A, ills. 6, 8 (1965).
80. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344 (1965).
81. Silvio v. Phlaroah's Palace, 517 So. 2d 185 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987) (bar fight); Broussard
v. Peltier, 499 So. 2d 1026 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986) (one guest strikes another); Ozols v. Irving, 491
So. 2d 719 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 496 So. 2d 348 (1986) (homeowner's nephew shoots
neighbor).
82. Willie v. American Casualty Co., 547 So. 2d 1075 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989) (parking lot
abduction); Davenport v. Nixon, 434 So. 2d 1203 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983) (motel patron robbed);
Ballew v. Southland Corp., 482 So. 2d 890 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986) (convenience store customer
raped). See also Suzanne Ciaccio, Comment, Business Owners' Duty to Protect Patrons From the
Criminal Acts of Third Parties in Louisiana, 53 La. L. Rev. 1847 (1993).
83. Stewart v. Gibson Prod. Co., 300 So. 2d 870, 877 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974); Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 344 (1965).
84. See Kelly v. Retzer & Retzer, Inc., 417 So. 2d 556, 561-62 (Miss. 1982); Rosensteil v.
Lisdas, 456 P.2d 61, 63 (Or. 1969). A landowner cannot act negligently, recklessly, or intentionally,
to the detriment of invitee. Boyd v. Racine Currency Exch., Inc., 289 N.E.2d 218, 221 (III. App. Ct.
1972), revd by 306 N.E.2d 39 (111. 1973); Genovay v. Fox. 143 A.2d 229, 239-40 (N.J. Super. 1958),
rev'd on other grounds, 149 A.2d 212 (N.J. 1959).
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The duty is to foresee the general risk of criminal activity and to take sufficient
steps to prevent harm to patrons.""3
Certain public employees, legally required to enter a landowner's premises to
make deliveries, collections, or inspections necessary to the landowner's activities,
have been accorded invitee status. 6 This classification is proper since their
presence is economically tied to the landowner's activities.87
Some states have enacted "recreational use" statutes denying invitee or
licensee status to persons invited upon a landowner's premises for "recreational
purposes." In states rejecting the classification system, these "recreational use"
statutes provide that "no duty" is owed the recreational entrant. In Louisiana, the
legislature enacted Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2791 and 9:2795 which provide
statutory immunity for landowners who allow their land to be used by persons for
"recreational purposes." Louisiana appellate courts have uniformly stated that
neither of these "recreational use" statutes limits the liability of "commercial
recreational facilities which are run for profit.""8
The primary difference between the duty owed to a licensee as opposed to an
invitee, is that with the latter, there is a duty to inspect for unknown dangers. 89
The landowner must exercise reasonable care for the licensee's safety if he should
expect that the licensee will not discover or realize the danger and lacks knowledge
of the landowner's dangerous activities.90 Further, if the landowner knows of a
85. See Page, supra note 1, § 11.3, at 294; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344 (1965);
Tarantino & Dombroff, supra note 60, § 6.3, at 123 (1990).
86. Toomey v. Sanborn, 14 N.E. 921 (Mass. 1888) (garbage collector); Jennings v. Industrial
Paper Stock Co., 248 S.W.2d 43, 45-46 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952) (sanitary inspector and governmental
employees or inspectors in general); Miller v. Pacific Constructors Inc., 157 P.2d 57, 64-65 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1945) (building inspector).
87. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 345 cmt. c (1965); Page, supra note I, § 5 11, at 114.
88. LaCroix v. State, 477 So. 2d 1246, 1249 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985) (quoting Keelen v. State,
463 So. 2d 1287 (La. 1985)); Pratt v. State, 408 So. 2d 336 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981), writ denied, 412
So. 2d 1098 (1982). The Cates v. Beauregard Elec. Coop., Inc., 328 So. 2d 367 (La.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 833, 97 S. Ct. 97 (1976), decision and its progeny do not logically mesh with the
"recreational use" statutes. For example, consider that a person entering landowner's property, with
consent, for recreational purposes is owed "no duty" while, according to the Cates jurisprudence, a
trespasser or poacher entering a landowner's premises to partake in recreation is owed a duty of
reasonable care. It appears that the "recreational use" statutes were designed in accord with the
common-law classification system due to their reference to "invitees" and "licensees." In any event,
is it sound policy for the law to protect uninvited persons and not invited guests?
89. Arcement v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 517 F.2d 729, 732-33 (5th Cir. 1975) (applying
Louisiana law and quoting Johnson v. Ruben, 222 So. 2d 617, 619 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969), which
quotes from Alexander v. General Accident Fire & Life Assur. Co., 98 So. 2d 730, 731-32 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1957)); Werth v. Ashley Realty Co., 199 N.W.2d 899, 905-06 (N.D. 1972); Steinmeyer v.
McPherson, 232 P.2d 236, 239 (Kan. 1951).
90. Natal v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 286 So. 2d 738, 741-42 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973), rev'd
on other grounds, 305 So. 2d 438, 440 (La. 1974); Foggin v. General Guar. Ins. Co., 250 La. 347,
361, 195 So. 2d 636, 641 (1967). The "active negligence exception" has been universally employed
by courts using the classification system. The exception is codified in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 341 (1965).
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latent premises hazard, reasonably hidden from the licensee's discovery, then the
landowner must exercise reasonable care in protecting the licensee from it.9 This
includes a duty to warn 92 of artificial hazards93 and latent natural dangers within
the landowner's knowledge.94 The landowner does not owe the licensee a duty
to inspect the premises for possible hazards of which he is unaware. 9,
It has been argued that a licensee is treated as a "second-class guest" solely
because he lacks a "business purpose" related to the landowner's property.
While initial logic may have supported this inferior treatment, in today's society
there is no justification for the rule. It is believed that this distinction caused the
great controversy resulting in the Rowland v. Christian" decision and the
aforementioned departure from the common-law classification system.9' Later
sections of this comment will show that some states have adopted a modified
classification system providing the licensee the same protection as an invitee.
These states continue to enforce the rights, privileges, and policies established
by the common-law rules while discarding the archaic distinction between
licensees and invitees.
In any event, an invitee holds the preferred status under the classification
system and has a greater probability of recovery than claimants of subordinate
status. If current premises law trends continue, the scope of the landowner's
duty to invitees will continue to expand even in states strictly adhering to the
common-law doctrine. Present day society demands that greater protection and
potential for recovery be afforded persons who rightfully enter landowner's
property, whether for business or pleasure.
91. Payton v. St. John, 188 So. 2d 647, 650 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966); Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 342 (1965).
92. Cothern v. LaRocca, 221 So. 2d 836, 840 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969), rev'd on other grounds,
255 La. 673, 232 So. 2d 473 (1970) (quoting Alexander v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance
Corp., 98 So. 2d 730, 732 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957)). See also supra note 59.
93. See generally Butcher v. Gulf Ins. Co., 295 So. 2d 45, 46 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974); Johnson
v. Ruben, 222 So. 2d 617, 619 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969).
94. Courts have held that a landowner has no duty to remove or warn an entrant of natural
hazards. Most of these decisions involved "open and obvious" dangers. Dowen v. Hall, 548 N.E.2d
346, 348 (111. App. Ct. 1989) (entrant dove into shallow, muddy water); Corbin Motor Lodge v.
Combs, 740 S.W.2d 944, 945-46 (Ky. 1987) (no duty owed against obvious "natural outdoor
hazards," quoting Standard Oil Co. v. Manis, 433 S.W.2d 856, 858-59 (Ky. 1968)). Presumably this
rule would not apply where the landowner knows of a latent, natural premises defect. For example,
see Brasseaux v. Stand-By Corp., 402 So. 2d 140 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 409 So. 2d 617
(1981) (bee attack in motel shower); Savoy v. DeLaup, 442 So. 2d 1209 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983)
(yard caved in "swallowing up" tenant).
95. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 342 cmt. d (1965).
96. 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968). See infra note 121.
97. Keeton et al., supra note 8.
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III. THE MODERN TREND OF DEVIATION FROM THE COMMON-LAW
CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM
American courts favor the creation of legal doctrine based on the doctrine of
stare decisis.95 Precedent provides the necessary continuity, reliability, and
stability in the law.99 A line of judicial decisions based on the same principles
provide time-tested authority capable of application in different settings. Such
principles afford society a reliable guideline in structuring their activities and
affairs. However, life does not occur in a vacuum, the law must forever change and
adapt. It is often necessary to alter or abolish a line of jurisprudence which has
strayed from its intended mark. The Utah Supreme Court in Snyder v. Clune,"'0
in a non-premises action, stressed the propriety of rejecting established jurispruden-
tial precedent by citing Justice Holmes:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was
laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds
upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule
simply persists from blind imitation of the past.''
Since the principles of the common-law classification system began in
England, 0 2 it seems fitting that the first deviation from the strict classification
system occurred when the British Parliament legislatively equated licensees and
invitees.'0 3 In response to inequities'0 4 evolving in the jurisprudence, the
British Parliament adopted the Occupier's Liability Act in 1957.'0' In the United
States, Connecticut was the first state to abolish the classification system by legisla-
98. Alternate terms include "stare decisis" and "jurisprudence constante." For discussion of
jurisprudence as a source of law in Louisiana, see Johnson v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 256 La. 289,
296, 236 So. 2d 216, 218 (1970); PPG Indus., Inc. v. Bean Dredging Corp., 419 So. 2d 23, 25 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1982), aft'd, 447 So. 2d 1058 (1984).
99. The Louisiana Supreme Court in Johnson, 256 La. at 296, 236 So. 2d at 218, stated that
"[flundamental and elementary principles recognize that certainty and constancy of the law are
indispensable to orderly social intercourse, a sound economic climate and a stable government.
Certainty is a supreme value in the civil law system to which we are heirs."
100. 390 P.2d 915, 916 (Utah 1964).
101. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1897).
102. Authorities agree that American courts adopted the classification system from early English
courts. See Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 79 S. Ct. 406 (1959);
Sweeny v. Old Colony & Newport R.R., 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 368 (1865) (first reported case in the
United States using the classification system).
103. The statute "abolished the distinction between licensees and invitees and imposed upon the
land occupier a 'common duty of care' toward all persons who lawfully enter the premises." Keeton
et al., supra note 8, § 62, at 432-33 n.2.
104. For example, social guests were being classified as licensees solely because they lacked a
business "purpose."
105. Occupier's Liability Act, 5 & 6 Eliz. II, ch. 31 (1957).
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tion.'" Illinois followed Connecticut's innovative "Premises Liability Act" or
"Guest Statute" and abolished the invitee-licensee distinction by statute.1
0 7
The initial jurisprudential rejection of the classification system occurred in
Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique.'08 In Kermarec, a crewman
on the S.S. Oregon, berthed in New York City, invited a guest aboard. Upon
exiting the vessel, the guest fell down a stairwell. The guest sued the vessel owner
for damages in federal court, under diversity subject-matter jurisdiction, claiming
the vessel was unseaworthy. At issue was whether or not the court must apply the
classification system in defining the vessel owner's duty. The United States
Supreme Court held that the common-law status distinctions used to determine the
duty of care imposed upon the owner of premises upon which injury occurs are not
applicable in maritime law." The Court concluded that:
For the admiralty law at this late date to import such conceptual distinc-
tions would be foreign to its traditions of simplicity and practicality....
We hold that the owner of a ship in navigable waters owes to all who are
on board... the duty of exercising reasonable care under the circumstanc-
es of each case."
0
While some commentators " ' have vaguely suggested that the Kermarec decision
rejected the classification system in maritime cases completely, subsequent
admiralty jurisprudence" 2 interpreted the decision to have abolished the invitee-
licensee distinction only. "
3
Foreshadowing the trend in abandoning the common-law classification system,
the Louisiana Supreme Court in Foggin v. General Guar. Ins. Co., 4 deviated
106. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-557(a) (West 1991). The law equated social guests to invitees. Also,
a landowner has a duty to take reasonable precautions to prevent foreseeable injuries when he should
anticipate a hazard. See Corcoran v. Jacovino, 290 A.2d 225, 228-29 (Conn. 1971).
107. II1. Rev. Stat. ch. 80, I' 302, et seq. (1987) (Premises Liability Act); O'Donnell v. Electro-
Motive Div. of Gen. Motors Corp., 499 N.E.2d 608, 611 (II1. App. 1986); Zimring v. Wendrow, 485
N.E.2d 478, 481 (III. App. 1985).
108. 358 U.S. 625, 79 S. Ct. 406 (1959).
109. Frank L. Maraist, Admiralty in a Nutshell 140-41 (2d ed. 1988); Grant Gilmore & Charles
L. Black, Jr., The Law of Admiralty § 6-57, at 453 (2d ed. 1975).
110. E.g., Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 631-32, 79 S. Ct.
406, 410 (1959).
111. See, e.g., Keeton et al., supra note 8, § 62, at 433; and Maraist, supra note 109, at 140-41.
112. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Stanships, Inc., 744 F.2d 1070, 1074 (5th Cir. 1984); see also Martin
J. Norris, The Law of Seamen § 667 n.15.
113. Therefore, when considering the issue of vessel owner liability, American courts are bound
to apply a "modified" classification system under which the vessel owner would owe a duty of
reasonable care only if the victim came aboard the vessel "for purposes not inimical to" the legitimate
interests of the vessel owner. The courts must determine whether the victim's presence was
"rightful" or "wrongful." Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630-32,
79 S. Ct. 406, 410 (1959). See infra notes 144-153 for state court applications of the "modified"
classification system.
114. 250 La. 347, 195 So. 2d 636. 640 (La. 1967). Also, consider the decisions in Daire v.
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from the strict common-law rules by classifying social guests as "invitees." This
decision was the precursor to Cates"5 and Shelton" 6 and gave clear indication
that Louisiana courts favored a change. Even before the Foggin decision, some
jurisdictions expressed discontent with the common-law rules." 7 The common-
law classification system had always troubled Louisiana courts because it did not
seem to mesh with our codal scheme "Of Offenses and Quasi Offenses" under
article 2315"1 and the concept of "fault."" 9
The classification system had been uniformly applied for many years, but
courts became disappointed with the "injustice," "confusion," and "resulting
complexity" created by its usage. 2 Nonetheless, it was not until 1968 that the
system was first completely rejected by the California Supreme Court in Rowland
v. Christian.'2' The Rowland opinion was one in a series of decisions by
California courts which "progressively abolish[ed] common-law immunities and
distinctions drawn with regard to [the] duty owed based upon the status of the
plaintiff relative to the defendant."'
' 22
In Rowland, the landowner-landlord was aware of a cracked faucet handle in
the apartment bathroom he leased to Ms. Christian. Plaintiff, Ms. Christian's guest,
was injured while using the faucet. No one warned plaintiff of the unreasonable
risk of harm presented by the faucet. The landowner had been informed of the
problem by Ms. Christian one month prior, but he failed to remedy the hazard. The
Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., 143 So. 2d 389, 392 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962), and
Alexander v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 98 So. 2d 730, 732-34 (La. App. Ist
Cir. 1957). The courts in these cases hinted dissatisfaction with the classification system but
fashioned exceptions rather than rejecting the common-law rules.
115. Cates v. Beauregard Elec. Coop., Inc., 328 So. 2d 367 (La.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833.
97 S. Ct. 97 (1976).
116. Shelton v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 334 So. 2d 406 (La. 1976).
117. Sherman v. City of Seattle, 356 P.2d 316, 320 (Wash. 1960).
118. La. Civ. Code arts. 2315, et. seq.
119. "The underlying principle is provided by Article 2315 .... The remaining articles [2316
through 2322] constitute amplifications as to what constitutes 'fault'...." Loescher v. Parr, 324
So. 2d 441, 445 (La. 1975).
120. See Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968). Some courts wrote that the
classification system had become a shapeless mass of intertwined principles overrun with technical
and confusing special exceptions.
121. 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968). The Rowland decision was haled as an opinion which will
"unravel the tangle of mischief, misconstruction, and misunderstanding that ... has vexed ... the
law of occupier's liability." ATLA News Letter, Vol.11, No.7, Sept., 1968, Orville Richardson,
Editor, p. 1.
122. McGeehan v. Bunch, 540 P.2d 238, 246 (N.M. 1975) (Oman, J., dissenting). See also
Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968) (landowner responsibility); Emery v. Emery,
289 P.2d 218, 224-25 (Cal. 1955) (intra-family tort immunity); Malloy v. Fong, 232 P.2d 241,246-47
(Cal. 1951) (charitable immunity). "The California Supreme Court has been the vanguard of the
modern trend to expand the concept of duty in tort cases .... [and has] returned to the fundamental
tort law principle, stated in Heaven v. Pender, [18831 11 Q.B.D. 503, that all persons are required
to use reasonable care to prevent others from being injured as a result of their conduct (case name
correction made)." Robertson v. LeMaster, 301 S.E.2d 563, 566 (W. Va. 1983).
NOTES
California Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, finding the trial court used the
wrong legal standard in establishing the landowner's duty. After reviewing the
development of the classification system, the court stated:
A man's life or limb does not become less worthy of protection by the law
nor a loss less worthy of compensation under the law because he has come
upon the land without permission [i.e., trespasser] or with permission but
without a business purpose [i.e., licensee]. Reasonable people do not
ordinarily vary their conduct depending upon such matters, and to focus
upon the status of the injured party as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee in
order to determine the question whether the landowner has a duty of care,
is contrary to our modern social mores and humanitarian values. The
common law rules obscure rather than illuminate the proper consider-
ations which should govern determination of the question of duty. 23
The court applied California Civil Code article 1714124 which stated "that
everyone is responsible for an injury caused to another by his want of ordinary care
or skill in the management of his property."' 25 Employing this basic codal
authority, the court stated:
The proper test ... is whether in the management of his property he
[landowner] has acted as a reasonable man in view of the probability of
injury to others, and, although the plaintiff's status as a trespasser,
licensee, or invitee may in light of the facts giving rise to such status have
some bearing on the question of liability, the status is not determina-
tive. 116
A dissenting justice argued that the majority's decision would allow a case-by-
case determination of landowner liability. He argued that this approach would not
be "workable" and the resulting jurisprudence would lack stability and predictabili-
ty formerly found in the law. Further, such case-by-case decisions lack the benefits
of the "guiding principles and precedent" of tort law.'27
In any event, Rowland provided the impetus for change in legal thought in
some American courts. The California Supreme Court was well respected for the
creative legal models set forth in their jurisprudence, however, each model could
not be tested prior to its establishment. Further, some of the legal principles which
123. Rowland, 443 P.2d at 568.
124. Cal. Civ. Code § 1714 (West 1985) is similar to La. Civ. Code art. 2316. Article 2316 fails
to specifically address "management of... property," but Louisiana courts have repeatedly applied
articles 2315 and 2316 in premises actions based upon a negligence theory.
125. Rowland, 443 P.2d at 568.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 569.
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work in one environment are impractical and burdensome in other jurisdic-
tions.'28
Nevertheless, the Rowland decision was accepted in varying degrees by other
states' courts. 129 "A number of American jurisdictions have squarely approved
the total rejection of the common-law status classifications as determinative of
liability and have accordingly adopted the rule that an owner or occupier of [the]
land is held to a duty of reasonable care under all the circumstances."' 3 Some
courts still use the status as a relevant, but not determinative, factor.
Jurisdictions ruling that an injured party's status is not determinative and
applying a uniform standard of reasonable care toward all entrants, regardless of
their status, include Alaska,' 31 California, 132 Colorado,, 33 Hawaii, 34 Louisi-
ana,135 Montana, 3 6 New Hampshire, 37 New York, 3 3 Rhode Island,'39
Tennessee, 40 and the District of Columbia.' 4 ' Most jurisdictions rejecting the
classification system have ruled that the rejection is prospective and not retroac-
tive.142 However, some states have applied the abolishment retroactively.
4 3
128. Considering the legal, socio-economic, political, and cultural aspects, among other factors
too numerous to be listed here.
129. See supra note 121.
130. Vitarts M. Gulbis, Annotation, Modern Status of Rules Conditioning Landowner's Liability
Upon Status of Injured Party as Invitee, Licensee, or Trespasser. 22 A.L.R. 4th 294. 299 (1983).
131. Initial rejection occurred in Webb v. City & Borough of Sitka, 561 P.2d 731, 732 (Alaska
1977). The Webb court found that "the subtleties and refinements of the rigid common law
classifications ... adds [sic] confusion to the law and is no longer desirable in modern times."
132. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
133. Kenney v. Grice, 465 P.2d 401, 403 (Colo. 1970) (initial criticism of rule); Mile High
Fence Co. v. Radovich, 489 P.2d 308, 314-15 (Colo. 1971) (abolishing rule). The Colorado
Legislature reinstated the common-law categories. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-21-115 (West 1991).
134. Pickard v. City & County of Honolulu, 452 P.2d 445, 446 (Haw. 1969); Gibo v. City &
County of Honolulu, 459 P.2d 198, 200 (Haw. 1969).
135. Cates v. Beauregard Elec. Coop., Inc., 328 So. 2d 367, 370-71 (La.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
833, 97 S. Ct. 97 (1976); Shelton v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 334 So. 2d 406, 410 (La. 1976).
136. Limberhand v. Big Ditch Co., 706 P.2d 491, 496 (Mont. 1985).
137. Ouellette v. Blanchard, 364 A.2d 631, 632 (N.H. 1976); Sargent v. Ross. 308 A.2d 528,
530 (N.H. 1973).
138. Scurti v. City of New York, 354 N.E.2d 794, 795 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976); Basso v. Miller,
352 N.E.2d 868, 872 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976).
139. Marioenzi v. Joseph DiPonte, Inc., 333 A.2d 127, 133 (R.I. 1975).
140. Hutchison v. Teeter, 687 S.W.2d 286, 288 (Tenn. 1985); Hudson v. Gaitan, 675 S.W.2d
699, 703-04 (Tenn. 1984). In Hudson, the Tennessee Supreme Court abolished the classification
system and established a landowner duty to exercise "reasonable care under all attendant circumstanc-
es." Id. at 703.
141. Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 105-06 (D.C. Cir. 1972). cert. denied.
412 U.S. 939, 93 S. Ct. 2774 (1973); Alston v. Baltimore & O.R., 433 F. Supp. 553, 567 (D.D.C.
1977). Both cases interpreting the law in the District of Columbia.
142. 62 Am. Jur. 2d Premises Liability § 82 (1990); Peterson v. Balach, 199 N.W.2d 639, 647
(Minn. 1972); Antoniewicz v. Reszcynski, 236 N.W.2d 1. 12 (Wis. 1975).
143. Carlson v. Ross, 76 Cal. Rptr. 209, 211 (1969); Hurst v. Crowtero Boating Club, Inc., 496
P.2d 1054, 1055 (Colo. App. 1972); Poulin v. Colby College, 402 A.2d 846, 851 (Me. 1979). The
NOTES
Some states partially rejected the classification system and opted for the
intermediate position.'4 4 These states' courts have abolished the distinctions
between the duties owed to licensees and invitees but maintained the traditional
rules regarding trespassers. Foreseeability of injury remains the fountainhead of
landowner liability; however, a claimant's status as a trespasser is of primary
importance.' s States adopting this intermediate view include Connecticut,46
Florida, 14 7 Illinois, 48 Maine, 49 Massachusetts,' 50 Minnesota,' 5 ' North
Dakota, 5 2 and Wisconsin.'3
Most American courts refuse to reject the strict common-law classification
system. Among the courts retaining the traditional categories, there is a trend to
enlarge the scope of the invitee class." States fully retaining the common-law
categories include Alabama,' 55 Arizona,'5 6 Arkansas,' Delaware,' Geor-
Poulin court abolished only the licensee-invitee distinction in the State of Maine, and the holding has
been given retroactive effect.
144. "Since 1982, no courts have followed [the] Rowland v. Christian decision outright." See
supra note 121. See also Keeton et al., supra note 8, § 62, at 433 (Supp. 1988).
145. 62 Am. Jur. 2d Premises Liability § 81 (1990); Keeton et al., supra note 8, § 62, at 433.
146. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-557(a) (West 1991). See supra note 106.
147. Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691,695 (Fla. 1973); Post v. Lunney, 261 So. 2d 146, 148 (Fla.
1972). Some Florida courts may be retreating toward usage of a more structured classification
system where licensees are divided into "uninvited" and "invited" class distinctions. Zipkin v. Rubin
Constr. Co., 418 So. 2d 1040, 1043 (Fla. App. 1982); Dougherty v. Hernando County, 419 So. 2d
679, 681 (Fla. App. 1982).
148. Rosett v. Schatzman, 510 N.E.2d 968, 970 (I11, App. 1987); Zimring v. Wendrow, 485
N.E.2d 478, 481 (III. App. 1985). In 1983, the Illinois Legislature enacted the "Premises Liability
Act" abolishing the distinction between invitees and licensees. Premises Liability Act, Ill. Rev. Stat.,
ch.80, 301, et seq. (1987).
149. Poulin v. Colby College, 402 A.2d 846, 851 (Me. 1979).
150. Doherty v. Town of Belmont, 485 N.E.2d 183, 185 (Mass. 1985); Mounsey v. Ellard, 297
N.E.2d 43, 51-52 (Mass. 1973). Massachusetts retains the traditional rule of nonliability to adult
trespassers injured absent willful and wanton conduct by landowner.
151. Pietila v. Congdon, 362 N.W.2d 328, 332-33 (Minn. 1985); Peterson v. Balach, 199 N.W.2d
639, 642, 647 (Minn. 1972).
152. O'Leary v. Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746, 751-52 (N.D. 1977).
153. Clark v. Corby, 249 N.W.2d 567, 570 (Wis. 1977); Antoniewicz v. Reszcynski, 236
N.W.2d 1. 11 (Wis. 1975). Wisconsin courts have criticized but partially retained the classification
system. See Mark A. Peterson, Comment, Liability of Owners and Occupiers of Land, 58 Marq. L.
Rev. 609, 618 (1974-1975).
154. Reasons cited include "the interest in judicial certainty advanced by the maintenance of
well-established and predictable allocations of liability under the common law." Gulbis, supra note
130, at 300.
155. Whaley v. Lawing, 352 So. 2d 1090, 1091 (Ala. 1977); McMullan v. Butler, 346 So. 2d
950, 951 (Ala. 1977).
156. Nicoletti v. Westcor, Inc., 639 P.2d 330, 332-33 (Ariz. 1982); Robles v. Severyn. 504 P.2d
1284, 1286 (Ariz. App. 1973).
157. Baldwin by Baldwin v. Mosley, 748 S.W.2d 146, 148 (Ark. 1988); Knight v. Farmers' &
Merchants' Gin Co., 252 S.W. 30, 32 (Ark. 1923).
158. Bailey v. Pennington, 406 A.2d 44, 47 (Del. Super. 1979).
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gia,159 Idaho, 160 Illinois,161 Indiana, 162 Iowa,' 6 3 Kansas, 164
Kentucky, 65 Maryland, 66 Michigan, 67 Mississippi, 68 Missouri, 69 Ne-
braska, 70 Nevada,' 7' New Jersey,' 72 New Mexico,1
73 North Carolina, 74
159. Epps v. Chattahoochee Brick Co., 231 S.E.2d 443, 444 (Ga. App. 1976); Meyberg v.
Dodson, 221 S.E.2d 200, 201 (Ga. App. 1975).
160. Mooney v. Robinson, 471 P.2d 63, 65 (Idaho 1970); Evans v. Park, 732 P.2d 369, 370
(Idaho App. 1987).
i61. Pashinian v. Haritonoff, 410 N.E.2d 21, 22 (i11. 980); Hessler v. Cole, 289 N.E.2d 204,
206 (Iil. App. 1972). Illinois courts, however, may be moving toward complete abandonment of the
classification system. See, e.g., Keller by Keller v. Mols, 472 N.E.2d 161, 163 (I11. App. 1984)
(stating landowner must exercise "ordinary care" toward minor entrants).
162. Barbre v. Indianapolis Water Co., 400 N.E.2d 1142, 1145 (Ind. App. 1980).
163. Champlin v. Walker, 249 N.W.2d 839, 842 (Iowa 1977); Rosenau v. City of Estherville,
199 N.W.2d 125, 135-36 (Iowa 1972).
164. Frazee v. St. Louis S.F. Ry., 549 P.2d 561, 565 (Kan. 1976); Bowers v. Ottenad, 729 P.2d
1103, 1105 (Kan. 1986).
165. Kirschner by Kirschner v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 743 S.W.2d 840, 844 (Ky. 1988).
Kirschner is factually similar to Cates v. Beauregard Elec. Coop., Inc., 328 So. 2d 367 (La.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 833, 97 S. Ct. 97 (1976). The Kirschner court, however, chose to rule in the
landowner's favor by holding that a trespasser cannot recover unless intentionally injured.
166. Bramble v. Thompson, 287 A.2d 265, 267 (Md. 1972); Mech v. Hearst Corp., 496 A.2d
1099, 1101 (Md. App. 1985), cert. denied, 501 A.2d 1323 (1986).
167. See Kreski v. Modern Wholesale Elec. Supply Co., 415 N.W.2d 178, 191 (Mich. 1987)
(implicitly upholds usage of the classification system). The court in Reetz v. Tipit, Inc., 390 N.W.2d
653, 654 (Mich. App. 1986), expressly approved usage of the classification system. The court stated
"Michigan has not abandoned these common-law classifications ...." Id.
168. Adams v. Fred's Dollar Store, 497 So. 2d 1097, 1102 (Miss. 1986); Astleford v. Milner
Enters., 233 So. 2d 524, 525 (Miss. 1970).
169. Davis v. Jackson, 604 S.W.2d 610, 612 (Mo. App. 1980); Pitts v. Fred Weber Contractor,
Inc., 466 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Mo. App. 1971). Missouri courts may be moving toward abandonment
of the common-law classification system. See Singleton v. Charlebois Constr. Co., 690 S.W.2d 845,
847-48 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
170. Buchanan v. Prickett & Son, Inc., 279 N.W.2d 855, 860 (Neb. 1979).
171. Nevada courts have not expressly stated their acceptance of the classification system, but
continual usage of it implies that Nevada has accepted it though landowner immunities have been
limited. Turpel v. Sayles, 692 P.2d 1290, 1293 (Nev. 1985); Nevada Transfer & Warehouse Co. v.
Peterson, 99 P.2d 633, 636 (Nev. 1940).
172. Butler v. Acme Mkts., Inc., 445 A.2d 1141 (N.J. 1982). The Butler court acknowledged
that "historical classifications of degrees of care owing to visitors upon land are undergoing gradual
change in favor of broadening [the] application of [the] general tort obligation to exercise reasonable
care . . . ." Id. at 1144. The legislature did enact a landowner's liability act making status irrelevant
when claimant was injured on non residential, rural and semi-rural improved lands. Diodato v.
Camden County Park Comm'n, 392 A.2d 665, 669-70 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1978); Snyder v. I. Jay Realty
Co., 153 A.2d 1, 5 (N.J. 1959); Caroff v. Liberty Lumber Co., 369 A.2d 983, 985-86 (N.J. Super.
Ct.), cert. denied, 377 A.2d 671 (1977).
173. There is no express statement by New Mexico's appellate courts on this issue: however,
by implication, the classification system is still employed. See Mozert v. Noeding, 415 P.2d 364.
366-67 (N.M. 1966) (duties to invitees and licensees); Latimer v. City of Clovis, 495 P.2d 788, 794-
95 (N.M. App. 1972) (duty to trespassers).
174. Andrews v. Taylor, 239 S.E.2d 630, 632 (N.C. App. 1977).
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Ohio,'"7 Oklahoma,17 , Oregon,' 7 Pennsylvania,17 8 South Carolina,'79
South Dakota,'8 0 Texas,'' Utah,' 8 2 Vermont,' 8 3 Virginia, 14
Washington,'85 West Virginia,'" and Wyoming.
8 7
IV. A CLOSER LOOK AT THE TREND AWAY FROM THE COMMON-LAW
CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM IN LOUISIANA
A. Cates: Louisiana's Abolishment of the Entrant Status as Determinative of
Landowner's Duty
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Cates 8' rewrote the state's premises
liability law by adopting a new standard for defining a landowner's duty to entrants
175. Moore v. Denune & Pipic, Inc., 269 N.E.2d 599,601 (Ohio 1971); Di Gildo v. Caponi, 247
N.E.2d 732, 734-735 (Ohio 1969).
176. Woodis v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 704 P.2d 483, 485 (Okla. 1985); Sutherland v. Saint
Francis Hosp., Inc., 595 P.2d 780, 781-82 (Okla. 1979). Oklahoma initially followed the trend away
from the common-law classification rules and statutorily established the "reasonable care" test. Okla.
Stat. tit. 76, § 5, 5(a) (1971). Oklahoma law has since retreated to full usage of the classification
system.
177. Taylor v. Baker, 566 P.2d 884, 888-89 (Or. 1977); Loney v. McPhillips, 521 P.2d 340 (Or.
1974) (refusing to adopt the "straight negligence rule" of Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (1968),
because it would not affect the case's outcome. The court stated "we now apply general negligence
principles of law in determining the landowner's duty of care to children." Loney, 521 P.2d at 344-
45.).
178. Crotty v. Reading Indus., Inc., 345 A.2d 259, 262-63 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975).
179. Parker v. Stevenson Oil Co., 140 S.E.2d 177, 179 (S.C. 1965) (Invitee status). Apparently,
Parker was the first case in South Carolina to use the classification system. All post-Parker cases
have used the classification system. See, e.g., Senn v. Sun Printing Co., 367 S.E.2d 456, 457 (S.C.
App. 1988).
180. The classification system in South Dakota can be traced back to the decision of Sanders
v. Reister, 46 N.W. 680, 684 (Dakota 1875). See Small v. McKennan Hosp., 437 N.W.2d 194, 199-
200 (S.D. 1989); Behms v. Burke, 229 N.W.2d 86, 91 (S.D. 1975).
181. State v. Tennison, 509 S.W.2d 560. 562 (Tex. 1974); Buchholtz v. Steitz 463 S.W.2d 451.
453 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
182. Tjas v. Proctor, 591 P.2d 438, 441 (Utah 1979).
183. It is unclear whether Vermont courts use the classification system; however, the Vermont
Supreme Court in Garafano v. Neshobe Beach Club, Inc., 238 A.2d 70, 74 (Vt. 1967), applied an
invitee status to plaintiff. Implicitly, Vermont courts use the classification system. See also Steams
v. Sugarbush Valley Corp., 296 A.2d 220, 222 (Vt. 1972).
184. Tate v. Rice, 315 S.E.2d 385, 388 (Va. 1984); Oliver v. Cashin, 65 S.E.2d 571, 572 (Va.
1951).
185. Younce v. Ferguson, 724 P.2d 991, 993-96 (Wash. 1986); Egede-Nissen v. Crystal
Mountain, Inc., 606 P.2d 1214, 1218 (Wash. 1980); Miniken v. Carr, 428 P.2d 716, 718 (Wash.
1967).
186. Pack v. Van Meter, 354 S.E.2d 581. 590 (W. Va. 1986) (implicit retention of the
categories); Payne v. Virginian Ry., 51 S.E.2d 514, 519 (W. Va. 1948).
187. Yalowizer v. Husky Oil Co., 629 P.2d 465, 467-69 (Wyo. 1981).
188. Cates v. Beauregard Elec. Coop., Inc., 328 So. 2d 367 (La.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833,
97 S. Ct. 97 (1976).
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upon his land. Prior to Cates, a landowner did not always owe a duty of care to
third-party entrants'" which may have encouraged landowners to use less than
reasonable care.'90 Before fully analyzing the Cates opinion and its effect, it is
necessary to examine the facts of the case.
In the evening of September 30, 1972, sixteen-year-old Larry Cates and two
friends went horseback riding on nearby property. The property provided a
frequent source of recreation to neighbors. In this rural setting the lack of fencing,
the absence of"no trespassing" signs, and the landowner's acquiescence served as
an implicit invitation to neighbors to enjoy the property. The property contained
an electric utility pole and power lines formerly used to supply a farmhouse.
Several cut power lines dangled from the pole, but current continued to flow from
the main power line to the transformer atop the pole.
On the day of the accident, the young men rode their horses onto the property
to search for a cut copper wire power line which they had previously seen. After
an unsuccessful search for the cut power line, they noticed the dangling power lines
on the utility pole and decided to remove them. This made it necessary for one of
the boys to climb the pole and disconnect the end of the line from its heightened
position. Cates rode his horse next to the pole and, by standing on the horse's back,
was able to reach the pole support steps. He shimmied up the pole to the
transformer, held onto the pole with his right arm, and reached with his left hand
to grab the cable. The resulting electrical shock knocked him from the pole. As a
result, Cates is a quadriplegic having lost his hands and feet.
Cates' father sued Beauregard Electric Cooperative and the landowner for
damages under a theory of negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment
for the landowner and Beauregard Electric Cooperative. The court found Cates'
status upon entering the property was that of "licensee," at best, to whom the
landowner owed no duty other than to refrain from willfully or wantonly injuring
him. 9 ' Further, when Cates climbed the pole to steal the power lines, his status
was reduced to that of a "trespasser," and due to the obvious dangers inherent in an
electric power pole, he was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. The trial
court declined to apply the "attractive nuisance" doctrine due to Cates' age. On
appeal, the third circuit affirmed the decision. 92 On further appeal, the Louisiana
Supreme Court upheld the judgments for defendants, but found the common-law
classification system "of little help in applying La. C.C. 2315."''
For some time prior to Cates, Louisiana courts expressed dissatisfaction with
the common-law classification system as a means of defining the landowner's
189. Hawkins, supra note 7, at 15 n.3.
190. Emphasis in the law was placed on landowner's freedom to use his property without fear
of liability to entrants.
191. As a licensee, Cates would be owed a warning of any latent dangers within landowner's
actual knowledge. See supra notes 53-54.
192. Cates, 316 So. 2d at 907.
193. Cates, 328 So. 2d at 370.
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NOTES
duty. 94 The courts found the common-law classification system made it very
difficult to apply Louisiana's codal scheme of "fault" in premises cases. No doubt,
the Louisiana Supreme Court became impressed with the growing number of state
courts 9 ' adopting the "reasonable care" standard set forth in Rowland 96 The
Cates decision was a prime opportunity for the Louisiana Supreme Court, in dicta,
to expand plaintiff rights while upholding a judgment for defendants. Despite
having sympathy for Cates, the court found that gross negligence on his part barred
recovery. 197
B. Cates Adopted the Uniform Test of Determining Landowner Liability in
Negligence Actions Created in Rowland
The Cates' 98 court set forth a test to be applied in determining the scope and
extent of a landowner's duty:
[W]hether in the management of his property he has acted as a reasonable
man in view of the probability of injury to others, and, although the
plaintiff's status as a trespasser, licensee or invitee may in light of the
facts giving rise to such status have some bearing on the question of
liability, the status is not determinative.'"
The court cited with approval much of the language from the Rowland deci-
sion."'
Louisiana courts must now determine landowner liability to entrants on a case-
by-case basis. This new test has been incorporated into the "duty-risk" analy-
sis. 20' Before analyzing the jurisprudence using the new test, it is necessary to
194. See supra notes 114-119.
195. See supra notes 131-141.
196. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
197. Today, under comparative fault standards, the case might be ripe for a jury trial. This is
assuming the trial court would not deem Cates to be 100% at fault as a matter of law.
198. Cates v. Beauregard Elec. Coop., Inc., 328 So. 2d 367, 371 (La.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
833, 97 S. Ct. 97 (1976).
199. Id. at 371 (quoting Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968)).
200. Id.
201. Sistler v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 558 So. 2d 1106, 1112-13 (La. 1990); Harris v. Pizza Hut
of Louisiana, Inc., 455 So. 2d 1364, 1369-72 (La. 1984); Shelton v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 334
So. 2d 406, 409-10 (La. 1976). The Louisiana Supreme Court in Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530
So. 2d 1151 (La. 1988), acknowledged that legal causation, as opposed to cause-in-fact, "could be
stated as part of the duty inquiry." Id. at 1155. Arguably the Pitre decision altered the duty-risk
analysis. "The new analysis appears to be:
1. Was any duty of care owed to plaintiff (was it a foreseeable risk)?
2. Was it breached (was there negligence)?
3. Was the negligence the cause-in-fact of the harm?
4. Was the negligence the legal cause of the harm (foreseeable risk)?"
Ferdinand F. Stone201., Tort Doctrine § 289, in 12 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1977), (Supp.
1990. W. Crawford. § 289. at 105 n.19).
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revisit the basic duty-risk analysis. Many duty-risk variations exist and are
employed by different courts and commentators. The idiomatic expression this
author favors is set forth in the following paragraphs.
The threshold issue is whether landowner breached a duty to protect an entrant
from the particular risk encountered. The individual "duty-risk" issues include:
1. What, If Any, Duty Was Owed By Landowner to Entrant?
Louisiana courts are now charged with defining a landowner's duty to third
party entrants in terms of the "straight negligence" rule.2"2 Employment of this
rule created controversy because premises actions were treated as "sui generis" for
many years. In essence, premises actions were governed by the special rules set
forth by the classification system.
Under present Louisiana law, the landowner owes all persons entering his land
the duty to act reasonably in managing his property.20 3 In defining the landowne-
r's duty, few Louisiana courts refer to the plaintiffs status as persuasive, and none
consider status determinative.2°4 In adopting the reasonable care standard,
Louisiana courts effected a wholesale shift in focus from the "plaintiff's status" to
the "foreseeability of injury."20' 5 This shift in legal thought will be discussed later
in this comment.
2. Did Defendant Breach This Duty?
Once the landowner's duty has been established, the next issue-a factual
one-is whether the duty has been breached by the landowner's conduct. Louisiana
courts appear to be using a balancing formula similar to that enunciated by Judge
Learned Hand,2° in determining the scope of the landowner's duty.0 7
202. Stone, supra note 201.
203. Cates v. Beauregard Elec. Coop., Inc., 328 So. 2d 367, 371 (La.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
833, 97 S. Ct. 97 (1976); Shelton v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 334 So. 2d 406, 410 (La. 1976).
204. See Ford v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 552 So. 2d 497, 499-500 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989);
Smith v. Walgreens, 542 So. 2d 766, 767, 770 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989); Rebennack v. LeBlanc, 519
So. 2d 209, 211 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988); Stanford v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., 512
So. 2d'553, 555 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 513 So. 2d 294 (1987); Bradford v. Consolidated
Am. Ins. Co., 493 So. 2d 895, 898 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986) (quoting Bareia v. Estate of Keil, 493
So. 2d 241 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982)).
205. Harris, 455 So. 2d at 1371-72.
206. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
207. The formula is:
a) Liability exists if: B < L * P where:
- "B" is the burden/cost of preventing the harm by warning of or remedying the
defect. This is a "consideration of the relative ease or difficulty which would have
been encountered by the defendant in taking steps to prevent the harm from
occurring."
-"P" is the likelihood or chance of harm. This is a "consideration of the chances that
any given harm might occur."
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Prior to Cates, if the landowner's conduct fell below the standard of care set
forth by the classification system, under the facts presented, then he was negligent.
Under the present law, if the landowner's conduct falls below the care which would
be exercised by a reasonable man under similar circumstances, then liability may
attach for the resulting harm.20 8 "Fault" in Louisiana is a broadly based concept
which embraces all conduct falling below an established standard of care.2 0 In
any event, "breach" is an issue properly presented to the trier of fact.
3. Was the Risk Encountered By Entrant and Resulting Damage or Injury
Incurred Within the Scope of Protection Afforded By the Duty Breached?
Historically, Louisiana courts have resorted to the following considerations in
determining the scope and extent of duty in tort suits: (1) Administrative; (2) Ease
of association; (3) Economic; (4) Moral; (5) Type of activity; and (6) Precedent or
historical. ° The "administrative" factor calls for an examination of whether the
"imposition of a duty in a given situation [will] open the floodgates to unmanage-
able litigation. 2 1' As it enlarges or restricts the scope and extent of a landowner-
's duty, the court is wary not to cut off valid claims or create opportunities for
frivolous claims. Litigation is costly and time-consuming, and thus courts are fairly
conservative in defining the scope of a defendant's duty.
The "ease of association" factor calls for inquiry into the relative ease of
association between the plaintiff's complaint of harm and the defendant's
conduct.'1 2 This factor is concerned with foreseeability and the relationship
- "L" is the gravity of harm incurred by the plaintiff. It is an "inquiry dealing with
a determination of how serious the harm would be should it occur."
William L. Crowe, Sr., The Anatomy of a Tort-Greenian, As Interpreted By Crowe Who Has Been
Influenced By Malone-A Primer, 22 Loy. L. Rev. 903, 912 (1976). A second formula is:
b) Liability exists if: U * B < L * P where: all the factors are the same as above,
however, the added factor "U" represents the social utility of the act(s), condition(s) or
thing(s) giving rise to liability. It "is a consideration of the value of the defendant's
overall enterprise or activity to society or the community in which it takes place."
Id. This test is "no more susceptible of mathematical application than are the factors of duty." Id.
It is a balancing of interests.
208. Fontenot v. Bolfa, 549 So. 2d 924, 926 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989); Harris, 455 So. 2d at
1372.
209. Harris, 455 So. 2d at 1372 (citing David W. Robertson, Reason Versus Rule in Louisiana
Tort Law: Dialogues on Hill v. Lundin & Associates, Inc., 34 La. L. Rev. 1, 22 (1973)); Kent v.
Gulf States Utils. Co., 418 So. 2d 493, 496 (La. 1982); Weiland v. King, 281 So. 2d 688, 690 (La.
1973); Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 258 La. 1067, 1074-78, 249 So. 2d 133, 136-37 (La. 1971).
210. Crowe, supra note 207, at 906-09; Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co.. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y.
1928); Hill v. Lundin & Assocs., 256 So. 2d 620, 622 (La. 1972); St. Hill v. Tabor, 542 So. 2d 499,
502 (La. 1989).
211. Crowe, supra note 207, at 907; Clomon v. Monroe City Sch. Bd., 572 So. 2d 571, 582 (La.
1990); Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hosp., 556 So. 2d 559, 563 (La. 1990); Dazet v. French Mkt.
Homestead, 533 So. 2d 115, 117, 118 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988); Ursin v. New Orleans Aviation Bd.,
506 So. 2d 947, 957 (La. App. 5th Cir 1987).
212. Crowe, supra note 207, at 907; Dillon v. Louisiana Power & Light, 557 So. 2d 293, 295
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between plaintiff's damage and defendant's conduct. 1 3 Recall, there is more
than one type of foreseeability.2 4 Here, the court must answer the legal question
of proximity between the type of conduct engaged in by the landowner and the
resulting harm.
The "economic" factor requires an evaluation of the financial impacts upon
plaintiff, defendant, and others similarly situated, and upon the local, national, and
international economies, if such a duty were imposed upon defendant." 5 Courts
often examine the possibilities of cost allocation. In essence, they try to shift the
cost of the loss to a deep-pocketed at-fault party who is best able to bear the
burden.2"6
The "moral" factor involves an instinctive or intuitive reaction according "to
what seems right or wrong." 2 7 Here, courts may look at the gravity of the harm
incurred, circumstances surrounding the accident, and personal characteristics of
the parties in fashioning a fair outcome. 8
The "type of activity" factor requires "an inquiry into the nature of the
defendant's enterprise."2"9 The foreseeability of injury to others is a relevant
consideration. If the defendant's conduct or practice involves a dangerous element,
courts may hold him to a higher standard of care because it is more foreseeable that
this type of activity will result in harm to others. For example, absolute liability
may be imposed solely because the defendant's ultrahazardous activities result in
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1990); Dunne v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 463 So. 2d 1267, 1269-70 (La. 1985).
213. See, e.g., Ronstadt v. Begnaud Motors, Inc., 427 So. 2d 911 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied,
430 So. 2d 82 (1983) (Plaintiff was raped while stranded in her employer's car which she had just
picked up from a dealership who did repair work on the auto. The Court held that the risk was not
within the duty.). Cf Jones v. Robbins, 289 So. 2d 104 (La. 1974), infra note 218; Wilson v.
Department of Pub. Safety and Corrections, 576 So. 2d 490 (La. 1991) (Prisoners escaped and,
thirteen (13) days later and eight (8) or fifteen (15) miles from the prison, robbed plaintiffs. The
First Circuit Court of Appeal reversed, in favor of plaintiffs, finding the risk of harm to be within
the duty. In essence, the risk was within the scope of defendant's negligence.).
214. Roberts v. Benoit, 605 So. 2d 1032 (La. 1991); Hill v. Lundin & Assocs., 256 So. 2d 620
(La. 1972).
215. Crowe, supra note 207, at 907; Sistler v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 558 So. 2d 1106, 1113 (La.
1990).
216. Crowe, supra note 207, at 908; Harris v. Pizza Hut of Louisiana, Inc., 455 So. 2d 1364,
1372 n.16 (La. 1984).
217. Crowe, supra note 207, at 908; Sistler, 558 So. 2d at 1113.
218. Guillotte v. Houston Gen. Ins. Co., 368 So. 2d 1026, 1028-29 (La. 1979); Jones, 289 So.
2d at 107-08. In Guillotte, an elderly woman tripped over Christmas lights strung across a walkway.
The lights were clearly visible but she attempted to step over them. The Louisiana Supreme Court
reinstated the trial court's judgment for plaintiff, finding no contributory negligence. The court
wanted to afford recovery for the elderly claimant. In Jones, a retailer sold gasoline to a child using
an improper container. The child was severely burned. Can you guess the outcome? Judgment for
plaintiff. Cf Kent v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 418 So. 2d 493 (La. 1982). In Kent, plaintiff was
electrocuted when his cement paving tool contacted an overhead power line. The court found
plaintiff in a pitiable state but refused to impose liability finding that Gulf States acted reasonably
in light of the circumstances and plaintiffs contributory negligence.
219. Crowe, supra note 207, at 908.
NOTES
harm to another.22 Absolute liability is "imposed as a matter of policy [due to
the high degree of risk of harm] when harm results from the risks inherent in the
nature of the activity.
22
'
Finally, the "historical or precedent" factor may be applied depending on the
circumstances. Courts often consider customary conduct between the parties or a
particular sector of industry.2 The owner of a particular type of land may have
historically been required to take greater care with regard to third-party en-
trants. 223 In such a case, the historical factor may play an important role in
defining the scope of the duty owed.
This set of factors should be considered and balanced by the court. Since duty
is a legal issue, the court must strike a balance between the competing interests and
define the scope of the breached duty or duties so as to fairly reflect acceptable
social policies.
224
4. Was Defendant's Conduct a Cause-in-Fact of Plaintiff's Damage?
Cause-in-fact and damages are traditional requirements in any tort suit. The
threshold causation issue under the "duty-risk" analysis is whether the defendant's
negligence was a "cause-in-fact" of the claimant's loss. 225 "Cause-in-fact" is a
term of art describing the factual examination of "whether the defendant's
affirmative conduct in any way contributed to the plaintiff's harm [or]... whether
the defendant [was] a cause of the plaintiffs harm? ' 226 Louisiana courts tend to
find that negligent conduct is a "cause-in-fact" of the harm if it was a "substantial
factor" in bringing about the harm.2 " Affirmative conduct by defendant includes
220. See Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying Louisiana law);
Rosenblath v. Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 432 So. 2d 285 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983). The court in
Kent v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 418 So. 2d 493 (La. 1982), contrasted "strict liability" with "absolute
liability" arising from ultrahazardous activities. "The classification as strict or absolute liability
carries significant practical consequences. One consequence is that there are limited defenses to strict
liability, whereas there are no defenses under absolute liability." (footnotes omitted). Carla A. Clark,
Howard v. Allstate Insurance Co.-Louisiana's Attempt at Comparative Causation, 49 La. L. Rev.
1163, 1166 (1989).
221. Kent, 418 So. 2d at 498. Once claimant proves defendant's activity gave rise to an absolute
liability claim then he "recovers simply by proving damage and causation." Id.
222. Welcker v. Welcker, 342 So. 2d 251, 253 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 343 So. 2d 1077
(1977); Craton v. Miller, 47 So. 2d 342, 343 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950); Crowe, supra note 207, at 909
n.16.
223. See, e.g., Franklin. v. Paul Dupuis & Assocs., 543 So. 2d 970 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ
denied, 545 So. 2d 1042 (1989); Thrasher v. Legget, 373 So. 2d 494 (La. 1979).
224. Harris v. Pizza Hut of Louisiana, Inc., 455 So. 2d 1364, 1371 (La. 1984).
225. See supra note 201.
226. Crowe, supra note 207, at 904; Wex S. Malone, Essays on Torts. "'Ruminations on Cause
in Fact," 161-96 (1986); Harris, 455 So. 2d at 1370; Lejeune v. Allstate Ins. Co., 365 So. 2d 471,
475 (La. 1976); Dixie Drive It Yourself Sys. v. American Beverage Co., 242 La. 471, 482, 137 So.
2d 298, 302 (La. 1962).
227. Breithaupt v. Sellers. 390 So. 2d 870, 873 (La. 1980); Laird v. Travelers Ins. Co., 263 La.
199, 209-10, 267 So. 2d 714, 717-18 (La. 1972); Dixie Drive It Yourself Sys., 242 La. at 482, 137
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the "acts of omission as well as commission." '228 Another test for cause-in-fact
is the "but for" or "sine qua non" test. 229 To be a "cause-in-fact" the conduct
need not be the sole cause as "[n]o event results from a single cause.,2 30 Finally,
[i]n determining cause-in-fact in a negligence case, causation should be
considered by the trier of fact without reference to policy overtones that
are involved in the case, and if plaintiff can show that he probably would
not have suffered the harm complained of but for the defendant's conduct,
he has carried the burden of proof on this question.23'
The court must also consider whether any intervening causes exist. Rarely is
there a scenario lacking at least one intervening cause.232 Intervening causes may
either have no effect on the original negligence, may concur in and contribute to the
original negligence, or may supersede the original negligence and be the sole
"cause" of the resulting damage. A non-superseding, concurring act of negligence
by a second tortfeasor requires him to share in the responsibility and liability for the
resulting damage to the victim(s). 233 An intervening, superseding act of negli-
gence by a second tortfeasor, on the other hand, imposes on him full responsibility
and liability, "thereby relieving the initially scrutinized defendant of any liabili-
ty."234 Nonetheless, a claimant bears the burden of proving the true mecha-
nism(s) of damage. 2"
The final requirement for a prima facie tort suit is "damage." 23 6 Whether
claimant incurred injury or losses is a factual determination produced by "a
mechanical inventory and assessment of the plaintiff's harm or harms-an
enumeration and evaluation. 237 The proper goal of an award in a lawsuit based
So. 2d at 302.
228. Crowe, supra note 207, at 904. Such acts are deemed "actionable negligence."
229. Crowe, supra note 207, at 905; Landry v. State Farm Ins. Co., 529 So. 2d 417, 421 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1988).
230. Crowe, supra note 207, at 904.
231. Wex Malone, Ruminations on Dixie Drive It Yourself versus American Beverage Co., 30
La. L. Rev. 363. 370-73 (1970); Stewart v. Gibson Prods. Co., 300 So. 2d 870, 877 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1974).
232. Crowe, supra note 207, at 909.
233. LeJeune v. Allstate Ins. Co., 365 So. 2d 471 (La. 1978).
234. Crowe, supra note 207, at 909.
235. See, e.g., Naquin v. Marquette Casualty Co., 244 La. 569, 574-76, 153 So. 2d 395, 397 (La.
1963).
236. See Harris v. Pizza Hut of Louisiana, Inc., 455 So. 2d 1364, 1372 (La. 1984); Coleman v.
Victor, 326 So. 2d 344, 348 (La. 1976); Jordan v. Travelers Ins. Co., 257 La. 995, 1006-08, 245 So.
2d 151, 155 (La. 1971).
237. Crowe, supra note 207, at 909. Evidence of damage may not be based upon speculation,
conjecture, or mere possibility. Proof of damage must based upon competent evidence. See Stevens
v. Gulf Am. Fire & Casualty Co., 317 So. 2d 199, 200 (La. App. Ist Cir.), writ denied, 321 So. 2d
363 (1975); Knotts v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 225 So. 2d 222, 224 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969).
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on defendant's tortious conduct is to compensate and restore plaintiff, as close as
possible, to the position he occupied prior to the accident.23
C. Reasonableness and Foreseeability Have Replaced Plaintiffs Status as the
Focus in Determining Landowner's Duty
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Cates239 adopted the standard set forth in
the Rowland decision.240 No longer would an entrant's status be determinative
of the landowner's duty; however, the status might be considered in defining the
scope and extent of the landowner's duty. The test is now one of "reasonable-
ness" 241 of the landowner's conduct based on the "foreseeability" of injury to an
entrant.242 Probability of harm and potential gravity of harm are two factors to
be considered together.243 The burden which would be imposed upon the
landowner to remedy the potential danger is balanced against these factors.2" An
added factor which some courts consider along with the burden on the landowner
is the utility of the condition or activity upon land.243 The shift in focus from
"plaintiff's status" to the "reasonableness" of defendant's conduct was designed to
allow courts to define the landowner's duty so as to make it easier for a plaintiff to
establish a prima facie case.246
238. Fogle v. Feazel, 201 La. 899. 910. 10 So. 2d 695. 698 (La. 1943).
239. Cates v. Beauregard Elec. Coop., Inc., 328 So. 2d 367 (La.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833.
97 S. Ct. 97 (1976).
240. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (1968).
241. Sistler v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 558 So. 2d 1106, 1112-13 (La. 1990).
242. See supra note 207. The "foreseeability" of the entrant's presence is a proper consideration
because the landowner should not be expected to anticipate the presence of a trespasser on the
premises or the presence of an invited guest in areas of the premises beyond the express or implicit
invitation. Arguably, allowing the trespasser or "unexpected" guest to recover is tantamount to
making the landowner the "insurer" of the safety of all entrants. The classification system makes
"foreseeability of the entrant's presence" the sole focus, notwithstanding jurisprudential exceptions
created, in determining landowner's liability. It is suggested that the landowner's non-intentional
conduct should not be a relevant inquiry until the entrant's presence is deemed "foreseeable." Of
course, this suggestion is subject to exceptions; for example, if the landowner's activity is
"ultrahazardous" or justifies the imposition of "strict liability."
243. Sistler, 558 So. 2d at 1106.
244. Id.
245. See supra note 207.
246. The "reasonable care" approach makes foreseeability of harm, due to a given premises
condition, the central focus. Basso v. Miller, 352 N.E.2d 868 (N.Y. 1976). The traditional common-
law classification system focuses on the foreseeability of the presence of the plaintiff on the premises
as the key consideration. Should the landowner be subject to suit if an unforeseen entrant is injured




V. LANDOWNER'S STRICT LIABILITY IN LOUISIANA
An analysis of the aftermath of Cates would not be complete without reviewing
the infusion of strict liability into Louisiana tort law. Early jurisprudence
interpreting Louisiana Civil Code article 2315 held that liability could not be
imposed absent "fault." '247 While "fault" defies statutory definition, it is clear that
strict liability is based upon the relationship between an owner or custodian and the
thing in his custody, and is not based upon "fault" arising from negligence.
2 8
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Langlois249 foreshadowed the advent of
strict liability by rejecting the historic equation of "fault" and "negligence." The
court explained that "fault" encompasses both negligent and non-negligent
conduct.250 Under the Louisiana Civil Code scheme governing liability for
tortious conduct, there can be no liability absent "fault.""25 By broadening the
concept of."fault," the court laid a necessary "stepping stone" for the subsequent
invocation of strict liability.2 2 Shortly after Langlois, the court decided three
cases by establishing strict liability actions under Civil Code articles 2317, 2318,
and 2321.253 The Loescher decision was the first strict liability case relating
directly to premises liability law and raised many legal questions. The strict
liability theory allows recovery where it was formerly precluded by the common-
law classification system.2
247. Samuel N. Poole, Jr., Does Louisiana Really Have Strict Liability Under Civil Code Articles
2317, 2318 and 2321?, 40 La. L. Rev. 207, 209 (1979).
248. Sistler, 558 So. 2d at 1112. "[Tihe common-law recognized fault as negligence or intended,
wrongful conduct. The civil law has also defined 'fault' in terms of wilful, unlawful conduct, as well
as imprudence or want of skill." Poole, supra note 247, at 209. Ferdinand F. Stone, Tort Doctrine
in Louisiana: The Concept of Fault, 27 Tul. L. Rev. 1, 9 (1952). Of course, it could be argued that
strict liability is based upon negligence. Consider that strict liability arises due to defects in a thing
under the care or custody (or ownership) of a person who bears such a legal relationship to the thing
that the policies of strict liability are justifiably imposed. In most cases, the "defect" giving rise to
the unreasonable risk of harm, and the claim of strict liability, existed due to the "neglect" of the
defendant in failing to discover it and/or remedy it. For example, the court in Sistler, 558 So. 2d at
1112, stated that the "fault [under strict liability] of the owner is based upon his failure to prevent
the building ... from causing such an unreasonable risk of injury to others."
249. Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 249 So. 2d 133 (La. 1971).
250. Id. at 137. "'[F]ault' is a broader and more comprehensive term than 'negligence'.
[therefore] the codal scheme imposes responsibility on a person not only when his negligence causes
damage, but also when the person has a legal relationship with a person, a thing, or an activity which
causes damage." Kent v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 418 So. 2d 493. 496 (La. 1982) (quoting Langlois
v. Allied Chem. Corp., 258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133 (1971)).
251. See La. Civ. Code art. 2315.
252. Poole, supra note 247, at 210.
253. Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975) (La. Civ. Code art. 2317); Turner v. Bucher,
308 So. 2d 270 (La. 1975) (La. Civ. Code art. 2318); Holland v. Buckley, 305 So. 2d 113 (La. 1974)
(La. Civ. Code art. 2321).
254. See, e.g., Loescher, 324 So. 2d 441.
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A. Loescher Set the Standard for Strict Liability Actions Under Louisiana Civil
Code Article 2317
With the emergence of Loescher, Louisiana premises liability took a new
direction.255 The Loescher decision opened the door to widespread use of strict
liability in premises actions
5 6
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Loescher interpreted Article 231757 in
defining plaintiffs burden of proof. To establish a strict liability claim, plaintiff
must prove:
1. The thing was in defendant's "custody";
258
2. The thing had a "defect";259 and
3. The injury or damage was caused by the "defect. ' '2W
Once a prima facie claim of strict liability is made, the defendant is liable unless he
proves the loss was caused by victim fault, 26' third-party fault,26 2 or irresistible
255. The Loescher dccision preceded Cares and forewarned of an easing of plaintiffs' burden
of proof. In the post-Cates era, the Louisiana Supreme Court decided Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 365
So. 2d 1285 (La. 1978), establishing modern strict liability under La. Civ. Code art. 2322. See also
Sistler v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 558 So. 2d 1106 (La. 1990).
256. Since Loescher, strict liability has continually spread through a steady broadening of the
interpretations given the basic elements of the strict liability actions under the various Code articles.
This trend will continue as different courts find the social policy existing in a new situation so as to
justify the imposition of strict liability. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Travasos, 569 So. 2d 1056 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1990); Vicknair v. T.L. James Co., 375 So. 2d 960 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979), writ denied, 379
So. 2d 10 (1980).
257. La. Civ. Code art. 2317 provides: "We are responsible, not only for the damage occasioned
by our own act, but for that which is caused by the act of persons for whom we are answerable, or
of the things which we have in our custody .... ' See Malone, supra note 226, at 372-73.
258. The Court in Loescher interpreted "custody" to mean:
[T]he things in one's care are those things to which one bears such a relationship as to
have the right of direction and control over them, and to draw some kind of benefit from
them. This relationship will ordinarily be associated with ownership, but the guardianship
will also belong to the . . [depositary], the lessee, the usufructuary, the borrower for use
... among others .... The owner may transfer the guardianship by transferring the thing
to another who will bear such a relationship to the thing as to himself have the care of it.
Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441, 499 (La. 1975) (quoting David E. Verlander, Ill, We Are
Responsible ..., 2 Tul. Civ. Law Forum No. 2, 64 (1974)).
259. "Defect" has been given broad construction to encompass any unreasonable risk of harm
to others. Loescher, 324 So. 2d at 447. See also Sistler, 558 So. 2d at 1112; Koppie v. Commercial
Union Ins. Co., 478 So. 2d 179, 181 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied. 479 So. 2d 922 (1985).
260. Loescher, 324 So. 2d at 1113.
261. See, e.g., Gibson v. Faubion Truck Lines, 427 So. 2d 68, 71 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983);
Duplechain v. Thibodeaux, 359 So. 2d 1058, 1060 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978); Loescher, 324 So. 2d
at 445, 447, 449. Prior to the enactment of comparative fault many strict liability claims were
terminated due to claimant's contributory negligence. Dorry v. LaFleur, 399 So. 2d 559 (1981);
Robert V. Vitanza, Comment, Victim Fault and Comparative Fault in Strict Liability, 48 La. L. Rev.
1249 (1988).
262. See, e.g., Motion Indus., Inc. v. LeBlanc, 532 So. 2d 498. 500 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1988);
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force. 63 If a defense is proven, defendant is entitled to have his percentage of
fault eliminated or reduced accordingly.
264
Article 2317 provides for the liability of a person who is the owner or
custodian of a "thing" which creates an "unreasonable risk of harm." The article
also states that a "person" is liable for the acts of another person for whom he is
answerable.2 6 The final sentence of Article 2317 makes the liability set forth in
the provision subject to "the following modifications. 26
Most litigation involving Article 2317 and its strict liability "test" involves the
interpretation of the term "thing," the concept of "garde," and the requisite "defect"
giving rise to liability. In order to be deemed a "defect" the thing must create an
unreasonable risk of harm" to others.267 Whether a risk is reasonable or
unreasonable is determined by the same formula used in negligence actions.268
However, in a strict liability action, the court must decide if the factual scenario
justifies the imposition of such liability by examining the existing jurisprudence and
prevailing public policy.269 The main difference between negligence and strict
liability actions 270 is that a strict liability action relieves the plaintiff of the burden
of proving defendant's scienter, in essence, that defendant knew or should have
Dufour v. Trosclair, 374 So. 2d 186, 187-88 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979); Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 365
So. 2d 1285, 1293 (La. 1978); Loescher, 324 So. 2d at 447, 449.
263. The "irresistible force" defense has been called the "act of God," "inevitable force," "force
majeure," and "fortuitous event" defense. La. Civ. Code arts. 1873-1878; Loescher, 324 So. 2d at
445, 449; Barnett v. Duraso, 479 So. 2d 675, 677 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985); Kirsch v. Kappa Alpha
Order, 373 So. 2d 775, 776 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
264. Comparative fault principles apply. Landry v. State, 495 So. 2d 1285, 1290 (La. 1988).
See Vitanza, supra note 261.
265. Much of the strict liability litigation concerning responsibility for another person's actions
has arisen under other Louisiana Civil Code articles. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code arts. 2318 (minors,
children, etc.), 2319 (incompetents), and 2320 (students, employees, apprentices, etc.).
266. The "modifications" referred to are the articles following Article 2317. La. Civ. Code arts.
2318-2324.1. The court in Sistler v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 558 So. 2d 1106, 1112 (La. 1990),
discussed Article 2322, a "modification" following Article 2317.
267. Sistler, 558 So. 2d at 1112-13; Ross v. LaCoste de Monterville, 502 So. 2d 1026, 1028 (La.
1987).
268. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). See supra notes 204
and 205. See Sistler, 558 So. 2d at 1112-13, and citations therein.
269. The court in Sistler, 558 So. 2d at 1112-13, stated that "[t]he unreasonable risk criterion
cannot be applied mechanically. This criterion is a concept employed to symbolize the judicial
process of deciding which risks are encompassed by the codal obligations from the standpoint of
justice and social utility." (citations omitted).
270. The court in Kent v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 418 So. 2d 493, 497 (La. 1982), noted that
"[tihe distinction between negligence cases and strict liability cases (such as Loescher) has largely
been either misunderstood or completely disregarded."
NOTES
known of the "defect" which created the "unreasonable risk of harm. '271 The
defendant is charged with knowledge of the defect.
B. Olsen Outlined the Burden of Prooffor Strict Liability Actions Under
Louisiana Civil Code Article 2322
As strict liability began to spread in premises liability law, claimants and courts
repeatedly turned to Article 2322. Article 2322 provided liability for injuries
incurred in dwellings and business prenises alike.272 Article 2322 has been
interpreted to allow strict liability actions 27 3 to be brought against building owners
when someone is injured due to "ruin '' 274 of the building.27 5 Here, as in Article
2317, the court must decide if the "defect" or, under Article 2322, the "ruin," of the
building is an "risk of harm" to others. 6 Also, as in strict liability under Article
2317, the owner is not relieved of liability merely because he did not know of the
defect.
77
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Olsen set forth plaintiff's prima facie
requirements in an Article 2322 strict liability action: 27
8
1. There must be a "building";
2 79
271. Id. at 497. "Under strict liability concepts, the mere fact of the owner's relationship with
and responsibility for the damage-causing thing gives rise to an absolute duty to discover the risks
presented by the thing in custody." Id. "Under traditional negligence concepts, the knowledge
(actual or constructive) gives rise to the duty to take reasonable steps to protect against injurious
consequences resulting from the risk .... " Id.
272. Article 2322 provides: "The owner of a building is answerable for the damage occasioned
by its ruin, when this is caused by neglect to repair it, or when it is the result of a vice in its original
construction." Injury caused by external decay or "fall" of the building is governed by La. Civ. Code
arts. 660, 661.
273. Strict liability under Article 2322 began when courts read the provision along with Article
670 and found strict liability should be imposed on certain building owners. Cothem v. La Rocca,
255 La. 673, 232 So. 2d 473 (La. 1970); Davis v. Royal-Globe Ins. Cos., 242 So. 2d 839 (La. 1970),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 911. 91 S. Ct. 2208 (1971).
274. The Louisiana Supreme Court in Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 365 So. 2d 1285 (La. 1978), set
forth the modem strict liability test under Article 2322. See Rand Dennis, Comment, Olsen v. Shell
Oil: Expanded Liability For Offshore Oil Platform Owners, 40 La. L. Rev. 233, 239 (1979).
275. The court in Otsen, 365 So. 2d at 1291-92 n.13, noted that "there are two competing
notions of the theoretical basis of the strict liability" under Article 2322. "[T]he 'fault' theory is that
even though we hold the owner of the building strictly liable, this liability is based on his 'fault' in
failing to attend to his building." Id. Next, "[t]he 'risk' theory is based on the notion that, even
though the owner may have a right of indemnification against some third person, he must bear the
primary responsibility for damage caused by the buildings as the quid pro quo for the advantages and
powers of ownership of the building." Id.
276. Id. at 1292.
277. Id. at 1289.
278. Id. See also Sistler v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 558 So. 2d 1106, 1112 (La. 1990).
279. Few Louisiana Supreme Court decisions have given definition to the term "building." The
first decision to do so was Cothern, 255 La. at 683-84, 232 So. 2d at 477. The Court stated that a
"building" is a permanent structure, but need not be intended for habitation. The court in Olsen, 365
19931 1967
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2. Defendant must be the "building owner"; 2 ° and
3. There must be "ruin" in the building caused by a vice in the original
construction or a neglect to repair, which caused injury to claimant.28'"
Once a prima facie case is made, the defendant may escape liability by proving
the same defenses as provided under Louisiana Civil Code article 2317. Thus, by
proving plaintiff s injury occurred due to victim fault, third party fault, or an "act
of God," '282 defendant may rebut plaintiff's prima facie showing and eliminate or
reduce his percentage of fault.28 3
C. The Interrelationship Between Actions Under Louisiana Civil Code Articles
2315, 2316, 2317, and 2322
The fountainhead of Louisiana tort law is Louisiana Civil Code article 2315
which provides the basis of liability for "fault. '2 4 The remaining tort law
articles85 following Article 2315 "constitute amplifications as to what constitutes
'fault' and under what circumstances a defendant may be held liable for his act or
that of a person or thing for which he is responsible. 286 While Articles 2315 and
2316 govern with regard to "fault" arising from negligence,287 the remaining
articles are necessary to define delictual responsibility because "negligence is not
So. 2d at 1291, found that certain appurtenances necessary for the use of the building were
encompassed within the definition of the word "building." See, e.g., Hopkins v. Travasos, 569 So.
2d 1056 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990) (concrete steps as an appurtenance).
280. Though "ownership" is defined in La. Civ. Code art. 477, Louisiana courts have been
creative in defining "owner" under La. Civ. Code art. 2322. The court in Olsen, 365 So. 2d at 1290-
92, found defendant was the "owner" of defective attachments to an oil drilling platform despite
contractual provisions shifting responsibility. The court found the living unit attachment was
sufficiently incorporated into the platform so as to become part of the "building." Id.
281. Many Louisiana decisions discuss "ruin" as found in La. Civ. Code art. 2322. Nonetheless,
no clear definition exists.
282. Le v. Johnstown Properties, 572 So. 2d 1070, 1073 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1990).
283. See supra note 261. See also Vitanza, supra note 261.
284. See generally Ferdinand F. Stone, Tort Doctrine in Louisiana: The Materials For the
Decision of a Case, 17 Tul. L. Rev. 159 (1942); Stone, supra note 248.
285. La. Civ. Code arts. 2316-2322.
286. Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 4], 445 (La. 1975). In dissenting, Justice Marcus argues that
Article 2317, by its language, is subject to the modifications set forth in Articles 2318 through 2322,
and therefore, Article 2317 is meant to be a "transitional article, rather than an autonomous rule of
civil liability." Id. at 451. He adds that the modifying articles "enumerate the specific classes of
persons or things for whose damage one is responsible regardless of his lack of fault." Id. The court
in Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133 (La. 1971). "expanded the concept
of fault in article 2315 to include responsibility for ultrahazardous activities without negligence,
namely, responsibility based on the notion of risk." Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1259 (5th
Cir. 1985) (citing A.N. Yiannopoulos, Civil Responsibility in the Framework of Vicinage: Articles
667.69 and 2315 of the Civil Code, 48 Tul. L. Rev. 195. 222-23 (1974)).
287. Actionable negligence constitutes "negligent acts and omissions." Loescher, 324 So. 2d
at 445.
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necessarily a basis for the obligation to respond in damages for harm caused by
persons or things for which we are responsible as provided by the subsequent
Articles 2317 through 2322."28'
Prior to the Loescher decision, Article 2317 was interpreted as providing for
additional delictual responsibility, regardless of actionable negligence on
defendant's part, solely because he is answerable for the person or thing in his
custody.289 Further, Articles 2318 through 2322 were designed to "delineate the
rules of civil responsibility for the damages caused by the minor children and
wards, insane persons, employees, students, animals, and buildings in one's
custody."2" It was suggested that Article 2317 was simply meant to set forth "an
autonomous rule: One is responsible for the act of things that are in one's custody
[care]; therefore, the victim was excused from proving the fault of the party
responsible."'29' Prior to Loescher, a strict interpretation was applied to claims
under Article 2317 which failed to show actionable negligence on defendant's
part.
292
In the beginning of Louisiana tort law, almost all premises liability actions
were controlled by Articles 2315 and 2316.293 A claimant brought his suit
alleging landowner's "fault" due to substandard conduct 294 in maintaining the
activities on or conditions of the premises. Such substandard conduct by landowner
was codally provided for in Louisiana Civil Code article 2316.295 However, the
Louisiana Civil Code provided very little guidance for Louisiana courts handling
premises liability actions. 296 As a consequence, premises liability law developed
through the common-law jurisprudence, as did most of Louisiana's tort la. 9'
This trend may explain why many code articles governing tort actions in Louisiana
have changed so little since their inception. The Louisiana Legislature apparently.
288. Id. at 445 n.3.
289.. Id. at 450 (Marcus, J., dissenting).
2.90. Id.
291. Boris Starck, The Foundation of Delictual Liability in Contemporary French Law: An
Evaluation and a Proposal, 48 Tul. L. Rev. 1043, 1050 (1974) (emphasis in original); Loescher, 324
So. 2d at 450 (Marcus, J., dissenting).
292. Loescher. 324 So. 2d at 450 (Marcus, J., dissenting).
293. These articles are read together to "announce the general rule of delictual liability, that is,
one is obliged to repair the damage he occasions to another through his own act or failure to act."
Id. This appears to be the concept of "actionable negligence." The court in Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp.,
762 F.2d 1250, 1259 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 258 La. 1067, 1077, 249
So. 2d 133, 137 (1971)), described the combination of articles 2315 and 2316 as the "fountainhead
of responsibility" in Louisiana tort law.
294. In essence, "actionable negligence."
295. Recovery under Articles 2315 and 2316 was allowed "only when the author of the damage
is proved to be at fault." Loescher, 324 So. 2d at 450 (Marcus, J., dissenting).
296. There were few articles specifically addressing landowner liability.
297. See, e.g., Ferdinand F. Stone, Tort Doctrine in Louisiana: From What Sources Does It
Derive, 16 Tul. L. Rev. 489 (1942); Ferdinand F. Stone. The So-Called Unprovided for Case, 53 Tul.
L. Rev. 93 (1978); Alain A. Levasseur, Bridging the Channel, 41 La. L. Rev. 69 (1980).
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decided many years ago to leave the control of tort law to the courts.2 98 Subse-
quently, few and insignificant amendments have been made to the original text of
code articles providing the foundation of Louisiana tort law. 299 Only in recent
years, since the liability and insurance crisis, has the Legislature enacted statutory
immunity provisions and other tort reform "packages."'
In a series of decisions, the Louisiana Supreme Court created strict liability in
Louisiana law."° Each of the different actions raised the standard of care owed
others even though strict liability is based on the defendant's legal relationship with
the person or thing which caused the harm and not on any particular substandard
act by the defendant. For example, in Loescher,0 2 the defendant owned a piece
of land which contained a rotten magnolia tree. The tree fell and crushed plaintiffs
car on the adjacent property. While defendant was not guilty of negligence, it was
his legal relationship to the property and the tree which created the basis for his
liability. Under early premises liability notions, the plaintiff would have lost this
action by failing to prove defendant's "fault" or negligence.0 3
The court's imposition of strict liability in Loescher is an example of the
court's decision to place a prima facie showing within the reach of a plaintiff who
is deserving of compensation. It seems that the court's widespread imposition of
strict liability in premises actions is a natural extension of the Langlois,304
Cates, 3°5 and Loescher 306 decisions. 3 7 The main policies underlying strict
298. Id.
299. La. Civ. Code arts. 2315-2324.1.
300. The 1987 legislative session alone resulted in at least 25 new provisions affording tort
immunity to certain persons or groups. See Ferdinand F. Stone, Tort Doctrine § 102, in 12 Louisiana
Civil Law Treatise (1977) (Supp. 1993. W. Crawford, § 102, at 49-50 n.33.5).
301. La. Civ. Code art. 2317 (Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975)); La. Civ. Code art.
2318 (Turner v. Bucher, 308 So. 2d 270 (La. 1975)); La. Civ. Code art. 2320 (Blanchard v. Ogima,
253 La. 34, 215 So. 2d 902 (La. 1968)); La. Civ. Code art. 2321 (Holland v. Buckley, 305 So. 2d
113 (La. 1974) (absolute liability)); and La. Civ. Code art. 2322 (Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 365 So. 2d
1285 (La. 1978); Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133 (La. 1971); Davis
v. Royal-Globe Ins. Co., 257 La. 523, 242 So. 2d 839 (La. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 911, 91 S.
Ct. 2208 (1971); Cothern v. LaRocca, 255 La. 673, 232 So. 2d 473 (La. 1970)).
302. Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975).
303. Of course, early Louisiana tort law imposed absolute liability in some cases where the risk
created by defendant was so great as to justify liability, absent negligence. See. e.g., Craig v.
Montelepre Realty Co., 252 La. 502, 211 So. 2d 627 (La. 1968) (pile driving); Gotreaux v. Gary, 232
La. 373, 94 So. 2d 293 (La. 1957) (spraying herbicides); Fontenot v. Magnolia Petroleum Corp., 227
La. 866, 80 So. 2d 845 (La. 1955) (blasting).
304. The Langlois Court "expanded the concept of fault in article 2315 to include responsibility
for ultrahazardous activities without negligence, namely, responsibility based on the notion of risk."
A.N. Yiannopoulos, Civil Responsibility in the Framework of Vicinage: Articles 667-69 and 2315
of the Civil Code, 48 Tul. L. Rev. 195. 222 (1974).
305. Cates v. Beauregard Elec. Coop., Inc., 328 So. 2d 367 (La.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833,
97 S. Ct. 97 (1976).
306. The Loescher decision could be described as a forewarning of the Louisiana Supreme
Court's intent to reconstruct the tort laws to afford increased recovery to claimants.
307. Edward Ursin, Strict Liability for Defective Business Premnises.One Step Beyond Rowland
NOTES
tort liability are accident reduction through responsible land management and risk-
spreading through cost allocation."8 No doubt, the imposition of strict liability
has spread the expense of losses incurred by unfortunate victims, however, it is
questionable whether accident numbers have reduced. The rationale may be flawed
because the theory assumes that landowners have a natural tendency to be carefree
in the maintenance of their property absent potential liability. It may be that strict
liability has provided an incentive for frivolous claims rather than an actual
reduction of the number of accidents. Recently, the Louisiana Supreme Court in
Sistler v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.so9 explained the rationale underlying strict
liability as follows:
Rather than the loss falling upon some innocent third person, the loss
resulting from the creation of the risk falls upon the person to whom
society allots its care, custody or control (guarde) [sic]. The rationale is
the owner is in a better position than the innocent victim to detect,
evaluate and take steps to eliminate an unreasonable risk of harm which
arises from the thing.
310
Again, this rationale may lack validity in light of the application of comparative
fault principles in strict liability actions.?"
1. Strict Liability Has Eaten Away at Negligence Actions
Although the redactors of the Louisiana Civil Code may have envisioned
"absolute liability" in some cases3"2 and mere negligence in others, it is doubtful,
by negative implication, that they ever envisioned the intermediate action of "strict
liability" or the like.3"3
As previously mentioned, strict liability in Louisiana developed as courts
applied common-law strict liability principles to the various code articles
31 4
following Article 2315. Strict liability claims multiplied as claimants created ways
and Greenman, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 820 (1975). The premises and strict liability laws in Louisiana
appear to follow the pattern set forth by California courts. See, e.g., Cates, 328 So. 2d at 367.
308. While traditional tort law provided immunity to business proprietors and landowners,
modern tort law has "ceased being a shield protecting business enterprise from liability and
increasingly has become a vehicle for compensating victims of accidents. Traditional tort doctrine
has repeatedly given way to reforms premised on the articulated goals of accident reduction and risk
distribution." Ursin, supra note 307.
309. 558 So. 2d 1106 (La. 1990).
-310. Id. at 1112 (citations omitted).
311. Landry v. State, 495 So. 2d 1284 (La. 1986). and its progeny.
312. For a thorough review, see Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 249 So. 2d 133 (La. 1971) and
Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985).
313. Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on the Role of Fault in the History of Torts, 31 La. L. Rev.
1 (1970); Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Liability for the Acts of Things, 42 La. L. Rev. 979
(1982).
314. La. Civ. Code arts. 2317-2322.
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to fit their claims under the statutory language of the "strict liability articles." The
court in Kent cited the problem stemming from the Loescher3"5 court's applica-
tion of strict liability principles to Article 2317 by stating:
Because the term "thing" [in La. Civ. Code art. 2317] encompasses a
virtually unlimited range of subject matter, the Loescher decision has
since been cited by innumerable litigants seeking to avoid the necessity of
proving personal negligence in tort cases. 6
The scope of strict liability under Article 2317, as under the other "strict liability
articles '31 7 is ever expanding. Courts have justified the increased imposition of
strict liability by finding that the "fault" of the liable party is based "upon his failure
to prevent the person or thing for whom he is responsible from causing such
unreasonable risk of injury to others., 318 So, as between an innocent victim and
the "person to whom society allots the supervision, care, or guardianship (custody)
of the risk-creating person or thing [animal, building, etc.]," liability is better placed
upon the latter.3 '9 The custodian is in a superior position to prevent the "condi-
tion or activity" giving rise to the unreasonable risk of harm.320
VI. SHOULD LOUISIANA RETAIN THE REASONABLE CARE APPROACH AND
REJECT THE COMMON-LAW CLASSIFICATION ENTIRELY?
Critics of the reasonable care approach have questioned why any court would
move away from a structured set of laws thereby reducing the body of time-tested
principles to a single, perhaps overly simplistic and vague, standard of reasonable
care. Nonetheless, in states repudiating the common-law classification system, the
jurisprudence has proven that regardless of which system is used,321 the result is
the same in almost every decision. 322 With regard to invitee and licensee cases,
this is not surprising as, in many cases under the classification system, courts have
found the landowner owed a duty of reasonable care to these preferred entrants.
Therefore, the real measure of difference between the two systems lies in the
treatment of trespasser cases and the cost-benefit ratio.
Under the classification system, the trespasser was owed "no duty" of care
whatsoever unless the court resorted to the application of an equitable excep-
315. Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975).
316. Kent v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 418 So. 2d 493, 497 (La. 1982).
317. La. Civ. Code arts. 2318-2322.
318. Loescher, 324 So. 2d at 446.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Application of the common-law classification system and the "'reasonable care" system
under general negligence principles has rendered like results.
322. Hawkins, supra note 7, at 32 n.141; William E. Crawford, Comment on Torts, 38 La. L.
Rev. 352, 353 (1978).
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tion.323 Courts rarely employed such exceptions. A thorough search of post-
Cates324 jurisprudence shows that some trespassers are able to recover under the
"reasonable care" system in Louisiana. 325 Nonetheless, there are many cases
denying recovery to trespassers.326
Prior to Cates, the "no duty" to trespasser principle firmly established a rule
of social order subordinating to the lawful interests of landowners a trespasser's
right to roam. The classification rules, as a whole, served many important
functions, including: (1) providing rules of social order which defined the scope
of a landowner's duty to entrants; and (2) definitively and necessarily allocating
decision making responsibilities.
A. Rules of Social Order
The classification rules constituted a "sliding scale" system reflecting the
foreseeability of injury to entrants, the obligation of injured entrants to heed
warnings and other precautions employed by landowner, and the varying economic
considerations that might justify placing a burden on landowners to protect a
particular entrant. The jurisprudence arising under the rules reflected an attempt
to balance the need to compensate the victim against the landowner's lawful
interest in the efficient, free use of his property.
The classification rules promoted economic efficiency in Louisiana land
development. Landowners did not fear liability or the cost of litigation because of
injuries sustained on the premises by all entrants. When faced with clear rules
governing their potential liability, landowners are more likely to use their property
in the most economically efficient manner. The absence of clear bounds of
potential landowner liability increases the cost of property insurance. By rejecting
the classification rules, Louisiana courts have moved toward making premises
liability laws solely a tool of compensation.
323. Supra notes 12-49.
324. Cates v. Beauregard Elec. Coop., Inc., 328 So. 2d 367 (La.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833.
97 S. Ct. 97 (1976).
325. See, e.g., Entrevia v. Hood, 413 So. 2d 954 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982), rev'd, 427 So. 2d
1146 (1983) (Louisiana Supreme Court reversed appellate court's judgment for trespasser); Bourg
v. Redden, 351 So. 2d 1300 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1977) (trespassers recovered because landowner set
a "trap"); Jones v. Gateway Realty, Inc., 550 So. 2d 388 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989) (trespasser
recovered less her 50% comparative fault), writ denied, 556 So. 2d 27, and writ denied, 556 So. 2d
30 (1990); Lewis v. State, DOTD, 436 So. 2d 1305 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983) (trespasser recovered);
Giles v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 384 So. 2d 569 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980) (Appellate court reversed
judgment for trespasser).
326. See, e.g., Humphries v. T.L. James & Co., 468 So. 2d 819 (La. App. Ist Cir.), writ denied,
470 So. 2d 123 (1985); Bizette v. State Farm Ins. Co., 454 So. 2d 197 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ
denied, 459 So. 2d 539 (1984); Bradford v. Consolidated Am. Ins. Co., 493 So. 2d 895 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1986); Thompson v. Ewin, 457 So. 2d 303 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984); Kaplan v. Missouri-Pac.
R.R., 409 So. 2d 298 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981); Flair v. Board of Comm'rs, 411 So. 2d 614 (La. App.




Landowners should be able to develop their property in the most profitable way
and should not be forced to alter the land or curtail certain activities solely to
protect trespassers or other entrants with interests not inimical to those of the
landowner. It is an unreasonable burden to make law-abiding landowners
constantly monitor all parts of their property in order to avoid liability to
trespassers. It is also unreasonable to force landowners and their insurers to incur
the costs of litigating frivolous claims brought by unlawful entrants injured on the
premises. Of course, public policy dictates that landowners should not become the
insurers of the safety of all entrants coming onto their property.
3 27
The classification rules also set out legal guidelines by which landowners could
structure their affairs and avoid liability.3 2 The rules sought to instruct
landowners on how and when they must act to avoid liability. By taking certain
precautionary measures, a landowner could be assured that his activities on or the
conditions of the property would not result in liability. The magnitude of
precaution required varied depending upon the foreseeability of the entrant's
presence, in essence, the entrant's status. Since Louisiana courts abolished usage
of the classification rules, much uncertainty has been injected into the scope of a
landowner's duty to entrants. Particularly, a landowner must now take extraordi-
nary precautions in order to avoid liability. The cost of such extra precautions are
an unreasonable burden. The presence of a certain entrant, like a trespasser, is
unforeseeable. Therefore, the cost of preventing potential harm to the trespasser
is extremely high because the landowner must employ safety, corrective, and other
precautionary devices and procedures on all parts of his property. Though a certain
circumstance may not give rise to liability, landowners often overreact, incurring
great costs, to avoid potential liability. Aside from employing the above described
devices, landowners often tend to overinsure the premises to protect their interests.
The need for rules of social order, which the classification system provided, is
evident in the nature of premises liability. Many instances of landowner liability
result not from the landowner's affirmative conduct but from an omission or failure
to act. The landowner is likely to be liable for damages that result from failing to
either correct a premises defect or warn an entrant of the existence of the defect.
Thus, the landowner's duty to anticipate the entrant and accordingly prepare his
property potentially gives rise to tort liability. The classification rules employed
the entrant's status as the determinative factor in defining landowner's duty because
the entrant's status reflected the landowner's ability or inability to foresee the
presence of the entrant. If the entrant's presence was foreseeable, it is proper to
impose a duty upon landowners to take affirmative action to make the premises safe
for the entrant. Of course, this duty is limited to the scope of the expected
327. Ferrington v. McDaniel, 336 So. 2d 796, 797 (La. 1976); Fontenot v. Bolfa, 549 So. 2d
924, 9"26 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989); Rasmussen v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 509 So. 2d 712,
713 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 512 So. 2d 441 (1987); Roberts v. Tiny Tim Thrifty Check, 367
So. 2d 64, 65 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
328. The classification rules promoted uniformity and certainty which are paramount ideals
sought by the civil law. Johnson v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 236 So. 2d 216, 218 (La. 1970).
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presence. Absent foreseeability of the entrant's presence, there would be no duty
to prepare the property for the entrant's safe use, passage, or otherwise. The time,
place, manner, and other surrounding circumstances of the entrant's presence are
determinative factors of the foreseeability of the entrant's presence and govern the
scope of any duty owed by landowners.
The rules provided an express warning to trespassers that their unlawful
presence on the land of another would not be protected over the lawful interests of
the landowner.32 9 The denial of trespasser recovery, absent intentional infliction
of harm by landowner, promoted popular social policy. There was little reason to
impose greater burdens on a landowner to restrict the use of his property solely to
protect unlawful or unexpected entrants. Rules of social order, like any set of rules,
are only useful if they are sufficiently flexible to promote fairness. Flexibility is
introduced through the creation of exceptions. Since the classification rules were
never intended to be given rigid application in all circumstances, certain exceptions
were created to promote fairness and public policy.
The classification rules and their exceptions grew over centuries into a fully
developed, time-tested set of legal principles capable of application in every setting,
and sufficiently flexible to meet the needs of modern society. An overwhelming
majority of American jurisdictions continue to employ the classification rules. The
classification system, like a constitution or code, must be interpreted and amended
to preserve its timely usefulness.
B. The Common-Law Classification System Provides a Structure for the
Relationship Between Judge and Jury
Commentators agree that the common-law classification system "served an
administrative function by providing a structure for the relationship betweenjudge
and jury.""' Under the common-law classification rules, Louisiana courts were
able to dispose of many trespasser and licensee cases at the outset by restricting the
scope of the landowner's duty. Trial courts often set plaintiff's status and
correlative duty as a matter of law.
The greater "front-end" control of juries was inexpensive and judicially
efficient.33" ' As in other classification jurisdictions, Louisiana courts were able
to restrict cases given to the jury to those which "turned upon specific and narrowly
defined issues.3 3 2 Restrictions on the issues tendered to juries are proper
329. Criminal law statutes prohibiting trespass are rarely effective as a deterrent and carry small
penalties for violation.
330. Hawkins, supra note 7, at 18 n.37 (1981); James A. Henderson, Jr., Expanding the
Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of Law, 51 Ind. L.J. 467, 511 (1976); Leon Green, The
Duty Problem in Negligence Cases (pt. 2), 29 Colum. L. Rev. 255, 271-72 n.56, 274-75 (1929).
331. Hawkins, supra note 7, at 18 n.38.
332. Id. at 18 n.39; Note, Torts-Occupier of Land Held to Owe Duty of Ordinary Care to All
Entrants-i"Invitee, " "Licensee. " and "Trespasser" Distinctions Abolished, 44 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 426,
430 (1969); Green, supra note 330.
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because juries are inexperienced in the breadth of legal problems and are ill-suited
to dictate substantive law or social policy.333 Further, as noted by other commen-
tators,334 juries experience problems in applying the negligence formula in cases
formerly governed by trespasser status rules. Juries lack sufficient instruction
under the negligence formula to consider, in the proper degree, the "special values
associated with the use and occupancy of land. 33 5
The negligence formula works well when each party has "reciprocal rights and
obligations" because there are "no special values or priorities" inherent in either
party's status. 336 However, the general formula is inappropriate "where
evaluation of defendant's conduct requires defining the contours of special relation-
ships. 337 The classification rules provided clear, definitive instructions requiring
the trier of fact to consider the special relationships involved and reflect upon the
social policies sought to be enforced. Some jury control is justified because juries
are often swayed by sympathy and personal bias. Louisiana courts have always
utilized evidentiary and procedural devices to avoid unfettered jury discretion.33
In 1981, Dean Hawkins33 9 released the results of a study examining whether
a loss of jury control occurred in jurisdictions employing the negligence formula
in all premises actions.-" The survey included an analysis of Louisiana premises
liability cases. Dean Hawkins noted that "of the states that have rejected the
common law status rules, Louisiana has demonstrated the strongest disposition to
limit the cases given to the jury under the general negligence formula." 34t The
Hawkins survey suggested that early "reasonable care" decisions342 were handled
by Louisiana courts by using a combination of risk-exclusion devices and other
"rulings of insufficient evidence of landowner's negligence." '34 3 The "risk
exclusion approach" mentioned by Hawkins describes the different devices
employed by Louisiana trial courts to dispose of premises actions. These devices
included: (1) finding plaintiff to be contributorily negligent as a matter of law; (2)
333. Basso v. Miller, 352 N.E.2d 868, 874, 877 (N.Y. 1976) (Breitel, C.J., concurring).




338. Commentators and courts have recognized the problem of unfettered jury discretion. See,
e.g., Hawkins, supra note 7, at 19. See also Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 569 (Cal. 1968)
(Burke, J., dissenting); Basso v. Miller, 352 N.E.2d 868, 873-74 (N.Y. 1976) (Breitel, C.J.,
concurring); Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691, 695 (Fla. 1973); Gerchberg v. Loney, 576 P;2d 593
(Kan. 1978).
339. Professor and Dean of Utah Law School.
340. Hawkins, supra note 7, at 15, 21-35.
341. Id. at 31.
342. As previously mentioned, in 1976, the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected the classification
rules in favor of the general negligence formula in premises actions. Cates v. Beauregard Elec.
Coop., Inc., 328 So. 2d 367 (La.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833, 97 S. Ct. 97 (1976); Shelton v. Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co., 334 So. 2d 406 (La. 1976).
343. Hawkins, supra note 7, at 32.
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finding therisk of harm to be outside the scope of landowner's duty;3" and (3)
finding the landowner owed a restrictive duty excluding normal hazards and
bizarre, unforeseeable events. Perhaps the most interesting finding by Dean
Hawkins is that utilization of the general negligence formula has made no real
difference in the outcome of premises actions. In surveying many recent Louisiana
premises actions, this author has found Dean Hawkins' conclusion correct, except
with regard to "trespasser" actions. Without further retreading the findings of Dean
Hawkins, this author will offer insight into cases subsequent to the Hawkins survey.
Before discussing the "front-end" jury control devices, it is necessary to
mention an avenue left unconsidered by other premises liability commentators.
Louisiana courts have procedural devices capable of controlling.the decisions of
juries. Two "back-end" jury control devices include: (1) the judgment notwith-
standing the verdict (JNOV),34 5 and (2) appellate review of fact. 46 The
judgment notwithstanding the verdict allows a trial judge to alter thejury's decision
based on his own findings. The Louisiana Constitution authorizes appellate courts
to independently review the findings of the jury. Appellate review is subject to the
judicial restraint of the "manifest error" or "clearly wrong" standard. 4 Nonethe-
less, as interpreted, the Louisiana Constitution authorizes an appellate court to
reverse findings of fact by the jury and render a decision based on its own review
of the appellate record thereby precluding further consideration of factual issues at
the trial level. 34 8
1. "Front-End" Jury Control Devices
a. Contributory Negligence
For many years the primary death-knell for many tort lawsuits in Louisiana
was the doctrine of contributory negligence." 9 If the trial judge concluded from
the pleadings that plaintiff, in any degree, contributed to his own injury, the
plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law, and the action was
summarily dismissed. This device was often used to terminate premises actions
344. This step in the duty-risk analysis has been treated differently in Louisiana jurisprudence.
Some courts treat the issue as a legal one while other courts treat it as a mixed issue of fact and law.
Still some courts treat the issue as purely factual. This dispositive device will be discussed further
infra text at notes 357-361.
345. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1811.
346. La. Const. art. V, § 5(c).
347. Rosell v. Esco, 549 So. 2d 840, 844 (La. 1989); Arceneaux v. Domingue, 365 So. 2d 1330,
1333 (La. 1978). See also La. Civ. Code art. 2324.
348. These "back-end" jury control devices are discussed infra V.B. 1.3.
349. See, e.g., Dulaney v. Travelers Ins. Co., 434 So. 2d 578 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983); Crowe
v. Hoover, 434 So. 2d 1231 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983); Sumner v. Foremost Ins. Co., 417 So. 2d 1327
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1982); Barcia v. Estate of Keil, 413 So. 2d 241 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982); Flair v.
Board of Comm'rs, 411 So. 2d 614 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982); Smith v. Louisiana Cement Co., Inc.,
405 So. 2d 687 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981), writ denied, 413 So. 2d 496 (1982).
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before they reached the trier of fact. In 1979, Louisiana adopted pure comparative
fault principles designed to ameliorate the harsh results of the contributory
negligence doctrine.3 0 Now, a claimant's negligence will only diminish, not bar,
his recovery as long as his negligence is less than 100%."'
The abolishment of contributory negligence impacted subsequent premises
actions in several respects. First, trial courts have been reluctant 3 2 to terminate
premises actions by finding the claimant to be 100% comparatively at fault. The
actions which have been summarily dismissed due to claimant's fault have involved
extreme faultworthy conduct3"3 on the claimant's part.354 Some of these courts
have described plaintiff's conduct as the "cause-in-fact" of his own injuries.
Second, as a result of comparative fault, more premises cases, which would have
been precluded by the doctrine of contributory negligence, are reaching the jury for
fault assessment. 35 Finally, while many of the premises actions which involve
a faultworthy claimant are now reaching the jury, there appears to be a movement
in the trial courts to find new ways to summarily dismiss such actions by invoking
the other risk exclusion devices. 356 Thus, trial courts have begun to broaden the
350. 1979 La. Acts No. 431 (eff. Aug. 1, 1980), La. Civ. Code art. 2323; Watson v. State Farm
Fire and Casualty Ins. Co., 469 So. 2d 967 (La. 1985).
351. Id. See also Socorro v. Orleans Levee Bd., 561 So. 2d 739, 760 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990);
Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So. 2d 1123, 1137 (La. 1988) (Cole, J. concurring).
352. This judicial reluctance is not surprising because, as previously mentioned, it is difficult
to compare the fault of a landowner and the comparative fault, based in negligence, of a claimant in
a premises action. A landowner's liability is usually based on his negligent omission, failure to act,
or a legal relation to the offending object. A claimant's comparative fault is usually caused by some
affirmative act or failure to exercise care for his own safety.
353. Now, victim fault must rise to the level of a substantial cause of the accident before it will
bar recovery. Rozell v. Louisiana Animal Breeders Co-op., Inc., 496 So. 2d 275, 279 (La. 1986).
However, note that the Third Circuit Court of Appeal's apparent expansion of the scope of cause-in-
fact to include conduct which "in any way contributed to the harm." Pastor v. Lafayette Bldg. Ass'n,
567 So. 2d 793, 795 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990).
354. See, e.g., Ivey v. Housing Auth., 514 So. 2d 661 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987); Davis v.
Winningham Datsun-Volvo, Inc., 493 So. 2d 719 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986); Wood v. Cambridge Mut.
Fire Ins. Co., 486 So. 2d 1129 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986); Hines v. Western World Ins. Co., 503 So.
2d 657 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987); Bradford v. Consolidated Am. Ins. Co., 493 So. 2d 895 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1986); Luckette v. Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc., 534 So. 2d 517 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988);
Inglett v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 464 So. 2d 790 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985); Giovingo v.
Cochiara, 449 So. 2d 699 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 456 So. 2d 165 (1984).
355. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 537 So. 2d 1283 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989);
Gardner v. Campbell, 532 So. 2d 292 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 534 So. 2d 446 (1988);
Madden v. Saik, 511 So. 2d 855 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 514 So. 2d 131 (1987); Gormley
v. Grand Lodge, 503 So. 2d 181 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 506 So. 2d 1227 (1987); Powers
v. Continental Ins. Co., 499 So. 2d 400 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986); Le v. Johnstown Properties, 572
So. 2d 1070 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1990); Johnson v. Beavers, 496 So. 2d 1251 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986);
Bivalacqua v. Aube, 493 So. 2d 209 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986).
356. The large number of cases surveyed by this author reflect this movement. Proof may only
be illustrated by reference to the following paragraphs which discuss the other "front-end" jury
control devices.
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scope of the other "front-end" jury control devices to compensate for the loss of
control created by the abolishment of contributory negligence.
b. "Risk Within the Duty"
Another risk exclusion device employed by Louisiana courts is the duty-risk
analysis used to analyze most tort claims. The analysis in its purest form contains
five parts.3 " As previously mentioned, it is the duty of the trial judge to formu-
late the duty owed by defendant landowner. This formulation involves two basic
steps: (1) determination, in general terms, of the duty owed by the landowner; and
(2) determination of whether the risk of harm encountered by the victim was within
the ambit of the duty owed by the landowner. The latter element is used to restrict
and shape the contour of landowner's duty. Under the negligence formula,
Louisiana courts have used this device to summarily dismiss many premises
actions.3"' There is evidence that trial courts have used this device with greater
frequency since the abolishment of contributory negligence.5 9
The real problem with the "risk within the duty" method of defining the scope
of a landowner's duty is the inconsistent treatment courts have given this duty-risk
step. Some courts have treated the "risk within the duty" factor as a purely legal
issue,36 while some have treated it as a mixed question of law and fact. Still,
some courts have been content with issuing the jury very broad instructions and
allowing the jury to decide whether the risk falls within the scope of the duty. 6'
357. Duty-risk analysis was discussed at length. See supra text accompanying notes 202-238.
358. See, e.g., Dunne v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 463 So. 2d 1267, 1269 (La. 1985); Broussard
v. Peltier, 499 So. 2d 1026, 1027 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986); Wright v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 538 So. 2d
291, 295 (La. App. 4th Cir.). writ denied, 546 So. 2d 166 (1989); Sutter v. Audubon Park Comm'n,
533 So. 2d 1226, 1229 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988), writ denied, 538 So. 2d 597 (1989); Savarese v.
Bye, 398 So. 2d 1276, 1279 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981); Giles v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 384 So. 2d
569, 570 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980); Jones v. Gillen, 504 So. 2d 575, 579-80 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ
denied, 508 So. 2d 86 (1987).
359. Id.
360. In these cases, courts exercise greater judicial control over the duty issue and limit the
number of issues presented to the jury. See, e.g., St. Hill v. Tabor, 542 So. 2d 499 (La. 1989);
Gresham v. Davenport, 537 So. 2d 1144 (La. 1989); Edwards v. State, 556 So. 2d 644 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1990); Sanford v. Reeves, 554 So. 2d 1328 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1989); Mang v. Palmer, 557 So.
2d 973 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989), writ denied, 561 So. 2d 117 (1990).
361. In these cases, it appears that the courts treat the "duty-risk" analysis like the common-law
"proximate cause" analysis, and greater discretion is afforded the trier of fact. Thus, the duty
imposed is drawn in broader terms, and duty limitations are determined by the trier of fact in setting
the scope of the proximate cause. See, e.g., Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151 (La.
1988); Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So. 2d 1123 (La.), certified question adhered to, 843 F.2d
831 (5th Cir. 1988); Fowler v. Roberts, 556 So. 2d 1 (La. 1989). Use of a modified "duty-isk"
formula resembling the "proximate cause" analysis is in conformity with the Louisiana Legislature's
refusal to adopt the "duty-risk" approach. See La. Code Civ. P. arts. 1812, 1917; Louisiana Products
Liability Act of 1988, La. R.S. 9:2800.51, et. seq. The Legislature disfavors the "duty-isk" analysis
because it promotes judicial activism.
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Of course, this latter method tends to make the "risk within the duty" determination
a purely factual one.
c. Normal Hazards and Bizarre Occurrences
Throughout the history of Louisiana premises liability, landowners have not
been held liable for injuries incurred by entrants who encounter normal hazards on
the premises. Louisiana courts often summarily dismiss such cases upon finding
that the claimant failed to prove an "unreasonable risk of harm. '362 Nonetheless,
there is proof that Louisiana courts have enlarged the scope of the term "normal
hazard" and "reasonable risk" in an attempt, perhaps, to compensate for the
diminution of other control devices. 363
On the other end of the spectrum, landowners have traditionally been immune
from liability for bizarre s61 unforeseeabl e, 36 or suspicious 366 accidents oc-
curring on the premises. Landowner immunity in such cases is in accord with the
accepted social policy that a landowner should not become the insurer of the safety
of all entrants on his property.'
The cases involving "normal hazards" and "bizarre, unforeseeable or
suspicious accidents" are the best examples of Louisiana courts giving definition
to a landowner's duty by finding such risks to be outside the scope of the duty
owed.
362. See, e.g., Bizette v. State Farm Ins. Co., 454 So. 2d 197 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied,
459 So. 2d 539 (1984); Entrevia v. Hood, 413 So. 2d 954 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982), rev'd, 427 So.
2d 1146 (1983); Barnes v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 573 So. 2d 628 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991); Haas
v. Eddie Ray's, Inc., 517 So. 2d 882 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987); Lewis v. Oubre, 461 So. 2d 523 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1984), writ denied, 465 So. 2d 735 (1985); Colleps v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 446
So. 2d 988 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984); Kaplan v. Missouri-Pac. R.R. Co., 409 So. 2d 298 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1981); Barcia v. Estate of Keil, 413 So. 2d 241 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982); Simmons v. isenmann,
470 So. 2d 277 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985); McGee v. McClure, 442 So. 2d 625 (La. App. 5th Cir.
1983). writ denied, 444 So. 2d 1225 (1984).
363. See supra notes 339-344, 362.
364. See, e.g., Crowe v. Hoover, 434 So. 2d 1231 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983); LaCour v. Cumis
Ins. Soc'y, Inc., 349 So. 2d 953 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977); Solis v. Civic Ctr. Site Dev. Co., Inc., 385
So. 2d 1229 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ refused, 390 So. 2d 1343 (1980).
365. See, e.g., Spurlock v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Supermarket, 475 So. 2d 20, 23-24 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1985).
366. See, e.g., Moazzami v. Board of Supervisors, 424 So. 2d 1112 (La. App. 1 st Cir. 1982),
writ denied, 429 So. 2d 145 (1983); Entrevia v. Hood, 413 So. 2d 954 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1982),
rev'd, 427 So. 2d 1146 (1983).
367. See supra note 327.
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d. Insufficient Proof of Landowner's Negligence
Since the Cates16 court set forth the landowner's duty, many trial courts
have summarily decided cases by finding the landowner did not breach any duty
giving rise to liability. Some courts have been particularly sensitive to premises
actions and require real proof that the landowner was negligent in some manner.
After all, landowners are not insurers of the premises and mere proof of an accident
does not necessarily imply that the landowner was negligent, or that a defect existed
on the premises.6 9 Since the adoption of comparative fault principles, Louisiana
courts have utilized this summary device more often.
370
e. Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (JNOV)
Trial courts in Louisiana are able to reverse or alter the findings of fact of the
jury by entering a judgment, notwithstanding the verdict. 37 The courts have
followed the federal standard set forth in the Boeing Co. v. Shipman37 2 decision.
A court is required to consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. Only
if the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor
of one party that the Court believes that reasonable men could not arrive
at a contrary verdict, granting of the motions is proper. On the other hand,
if there is substantial evidence opposed to the motions, that is, evidence
of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in the
exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions, the
motions should be denied.373
The Boeing court rejected the more traditional view that "it is only when there is
a complete absence of probative facts to support the conclusion reached that the
jury's judgment may be ignored. 374
The JNOV is a powerful device used by trial courts which refuse to accept the
final word of the jury in premises actions. A review of the jurisprudence under the
368. Cates v. Beauregard Elec. Coop., Inc., 328 So. 2d 367 (La.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833,
97 S. Ct. 97 (1976).
369. See, e.g., Richard v. Sonnier, 363 So. 2d 961 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978); Barcia v. Estate of
Keil, 413 So. 2d 241 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982).
370. See, e.g., Cappo v. Alliance Ins. Co., 499 So. 2d 233 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986); McCormick
v. Insured Lloyds Ins. Co., 488 So. 2d 491 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986); Bell v. State, 553 So. 2d 902
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1989); Inglett v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 464 So. 2d 790 (La. App. 5th
Cir. 1985); Savoy v. Delaup, 442 So. 2d 1209 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983).
371. For brevity purposes, a JNOV. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 1811.
372. 411 F.2d 365, 374 (5th Cir. 1969).
373. Id. at 374; Campbell v. Mouton, 373 So. 2d 237, 239 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979); Scott v.
Hospital Serv. Dist. No. 1, 496 So. 2d 270, 273 (La. 1986).
374. Boeing Co., 411 F.2d at 370 (emphasis in original); Planters Mfg. Co. v. Protection Mut.
Ins. Co., 380 F.2d 869, 874 (5th Cir. 1967). The Planters decision set forth the traditional view.
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common-law classification system and the "reasonable care" system proves that
Louisiana trial courts have an increased tendency to utilize the JNOV to correct jury
verdicts. 75 In many of these actions, the trial judge simply disagrees with the
jury's assessment of fault.376 Some JNOV's result from the trial judge's lack of
deference to the jury's credibility assessment of witnesses.3" Of course, some
courts properly adhere to the rule that "[in applying [the JNOV] standard, the court
does not weigh the evidence, pass on the credibility of the witnesses, or substitute
its factual judgment for the jury's. ' 378 Finally, some JNOV's result from a
difference in opinion between the trial judge and the jury as to what constitutes an
"unreasonable risk of harm" and/or negligence. 379
The JNOV is a "back-end" jury control device which deserves due attention
and discretion. Currently this device is used by Louisiana trial courts to alter the
findings of fact of the jury, 30 but without the proper application, the device
further erodes the foundation of and trust placed in the civil jury system in
Louisiana.
f Appellate Review of Fact
Over time, the Louisiana Legislature amended the Code of Civil Procedure to
limit a claimant's ability to request a trial by jury.38 ' Today, a large majority of
all civil jury trials are based on a theory of tort law.38 2 A majority of the civil jury
trials based in tort involve some, if not many, issues of landowner liability.
A thorough review of appellate opinions involving civil juries shows that many
decisions are being altered by the reviewing courts.38 3 Louisiana appellate courts
375. See, e.g., Doming v. K-Mart Corp.. 540 So. 2d 400 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989); Dean v.
Terrebonne Parish Police Jury, 510 So. 2d 82 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987); Zeagler v. Dillard Dep't
Stores, Inc., 521 So. 2d 766 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988); Silliker v. St. Landry Parish Police Jury, 520
So. 2d 880 (La. App. 3d Cit. 1987).
376. See, e.g., Wheat v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 583 So. 2d I (La. App. Ist Cir.), writ
denied, 583 So. 2d 1145 (1991); Hutchinson v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 573 So. 2d 1148 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1990); Silliker, 521 So. 2d 766.
377. See, e.g., Miller v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 527 So. 2d 989 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied,
531 So. 2d 763 (1988); Alumbaugh v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 492 So. 2d 545 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1986); Dean v. Terrebonne Parish Police Jury, 510 So. 2d 82 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987).
378. See, e.g., Wooten v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 477 So. 2d 1142. 1144 (La. App. Ist
Cit. 1985); Jackson v. Quick, 543 So. 2d 552, 553 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 546 So. 2d 1219
(1989); Blum v. NOPSI, 469 So. 2d 1117, 1119 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 472 So. 2d 921
(1985); Trans Global Alloy Ltd. v. First Nat'l Bank of Jefferson Parish, 564 So. 2d 697, 710 (La.
App. 5th Cit. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 583 So. 2d 443 (1991).
379. Jackson, 543 So. 2d 552; Crowther v. K-Mart Corp., 568 So. 2d 669 (La. App. 4th Cir.),
writ denied, 571 So. 2d 656 (1990); Zeagler, 521 So. 2d 766.
380. See supra.notes 375-377, 379.
381. See generally La. Code Civ. P. arts. 1731, 1732.
382. This author has conducted an extensive analysis of civil jury trials in Louisiana.
383. This author has studied over 800 Louisiana appellate cases involving civil juries. This
sample size is sufficiently large to provide a fair representation of the trends in appellate review in
each Louisiana court of appeal. A sampling method was employed to ensure reliability. Of 168
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have frequently disagreed with civil juries assessing fault in premises actions.384
Several possible reasons for the courts' lack of deference to civil juries come to
mind. First, it could be that Louisiana courts, with the unique and awesome power
of appellate review of facts, have developed a distrust of jury findings of fact. It
has frequently been asserted that juries are swayed by emotional and moral pleas
of experienced advocates. Civil juries have been accused of abandoning their
entrusted role of fact finding and actively seeking to serve non-civil functions of
retribution and deterrence. 38 5 It could be argued that increased appellate supervi-
sion is necessary because juries have trouble assessing comparative fault and/or
negligence. 3 6 Reviewing courts have also noted jury difficulties in balancing
factors, in the proper degree, in the determination of whether the offending object
or condition gives rise to an "unreasonable risk of harm. ' 387 Finally, on some
occasions, juries simply are unable to determine whether the landowner breached
a duty of care at all. 388 A concluding proposition to explain the increased
exercise of appellate review of facts lies in the applicable standard of care. In order
to disturb the findings of a jury, the reviewing court must find "manifest error" or
"clearly wrong" findings of fact.38 9 These terms obviously connote that an
cases surveyed from the First Circuit Court of Appeal, only 74 of the cases involved no alteration
of the jury's findings of fact. Of 74 cases surveyed from the Second, Circuit Court of Appeal, only
40 of the cases involved no alteration of the jury's findings of fact. Of 249 cases surveyed from the
Third Circuit Court of Appeal, only 134 of the cases involved no alteration of the jury's findings of
fact. Of 176 cases surveyed from the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, only 71 of the cases involved
no alteration of the jury's findings of fact. Of 98 cases surveyed from the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeal, only 52 of the cases involved no alteration of the jury's findings of fact.
384. See, e.g., St. Hill v. Tabor, 542 So. 2d 499 (La. 1989), writ denied, 556 So. 2d 1262
(1990); Bergeron v. K-Mart Corp., 540 So. 2d 406 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 544 So. 2d 408,
and writ denied, 544 So. 2d 512 (1989); Bolen v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 454 So. 2d 1280
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1984); Miller v. Winn-Dixie Stores. Inc., 527 So. 2d 989 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ
denied, 531 So. 2d 763 (1988); Madden v. Saik, 511 So. 2d 855 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied. 514
So. 2d 131 (1987); Bernard v. Casualty Reciprocal Exch., 534 So. 2d 1348 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988),
writ denied, 536 So. 2d 1241 (1989). See also William E. Crawford, Should Louisiana Retain Civil
Appellate Review of Facts?, 35 La. B.J. 244 (1987).
385. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 n.20, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 1874 n.20 (1979). Juries may
desire to compensate the victim while punishing the defendant.
386. See, e.g., Watson v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Ins. Co., 469 So. 2d 967 (La. 1985); St.
Hill v. Tabor, 542 So. 2d 499 (La. 1989); Bonnette v. K-Mart, Inc., 502 So. 2d 202, 205 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1987); Weber v. Buccola-McKenzie, Inc., 541 So. 2d 315 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989); Bernard.
534 So. 2d 1348.
387. See, e.g., Tupper v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 553 So. 2d 488 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1989); Luttrell v. International Paper Co., 532 So. 2d 389 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 533 So.
2d 384 (1988); McCargar v. Babin Motors, Inc., 499 So. 2d 1081 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
388. See, e.g., Schrader v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 571 So. 2d 218 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1990), writ denied, 575 So. 2d 370 (1991); Veal v. M & M Properties, Ltd., 525 So. 2d 188 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1988); Henry v. Safeco Ins. Co., 498 So. 2d 1116 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986), writ denied,
501 So. 2d 235 (1987).
389. Rosell v. Esco, 549 So. 2d 840 (La. 1989). In Rosell, Justice Dennis carefully and
thoroughly discussed the basis for appellate review in Louisiana. See also Albert Tate, Jr., Manifest
Error: Further Observations on Appellate Review of Facts in Louisiana Civil Cases, 22 La. L. Rev.
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extremely erroneous decision is required in order to justify the reversal of a civil
jury in Louisiana.
In any event, the unique power of Louisiana courts to exercise appellate review
more broadly than other states' courts constitutes an additional jury control device.
Courts use this "back-end" control device to supervise juries in their resolution of
difficult issues in premises actions.
C. The Cost Versus Benefit Analysis
Several reasons have been cited supporting Louisiana's abandonment of the
classification rules. First, it has been argued that the classification rules were
inequitable because "licensees" were virtually equated to "trespassers." This
problem alone does not justify abandonment of the rules as the "modified"
classification system is capable of curing the perceived inequity. Some jurisdic-
tions have adopted this view in order to preserve the usefulness of the common-law
classification rules.
Second, it was believed that the "reasonable care" system would result in a
greater number of premises actions reaching the jury. Due to the unique jury
control devices 39 frequently employed by Louisiana courts, this result has not
prevailed.39' In fact, most jurisdictions adopting the "reasonable care" system
have experienced a loss of jury control in premises actions.3 92 While Louisiana
courts have not experienced a loss of jury control in premises actions, this author
suggests that the extreme jury control being exercised has created greater problems
in all civil jury trials.393
Also, as previously mentioned, most decisions under the "reasonable care"
approach could have been reached under the more judicially efficient classification
rules.394 One difference noted between the systems is that trespassers now have
an enhanced ability to recover. 39 Another difference involves the focus of
argument in premises liability actions. Under the classification system, the parties
argued over the proper "status" of the claimant and whether one of the well-defined
equitable exceptions should be employed. Now, parties spend hours arguing every
minute factual detail seeking to define "reasonable care" suitable to their position.
The final difference between the systems is that, under the "reasonable care"
system, the body of law properly termed "premises actions" fails to provide
substantive rules of social order. There is no clear definition of "reasonable care."
The "reasonable care" system does not lend itself to clear interpretation and
instruction for landowners. The only certain outcome is that landowners must
605 (1962).
390. Both "front-end" and "back-end" jury control devices. See supra notes 349-389.
391. Hawkins, supra note 7.
392. See also Britt v. Allen County Community Junior College, 638 P.2d 914, 918 (Kan. 1982).
393. Many of the problems involve cost considerations.
394. Supra notes 330-389.
395. Supra note 325.
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overreact to avoid liability. Of course, in recent years, many immunity statutes




Tort reform is needed in the area of premises liability in Louisiana. The
transition from the common-law classification system to the "reasonable care to all
entrants" system has created some problems. Courts continue to employ
classification system equitable exceptions but generally ignore the substantive
guidelines that developed under the rules. Extreme jury control is being exercised
by Louisiana courts in an attempt to counteract potential difficulties juries
experience with the general negligence formula. Immunity statutes are being
adopted to carve holes in the broad legal duties proposed by the "reasonable care
to all entrants" system. These statutes are designed to place Louisiana premises
liability laws in the same position as they were under the common-law classifica-
tion system. This apparent full circle retreat needs closer examination.
This author suggests that Louisiana adopt a "modified" classification system
approach. Further, the extreme jury control currently being exercised by Louisiana
courts will fade if Louisiana tort law, including premises liability law, adopts
reforms which add substance to the law.
David A. Szwak
396. This trend can be seen in all areas of tort law. Louisiana tort reform appears to be closing
on a full circle return to the substantive rules of common-law torts. Many of the reforms can be
found in Title 9 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes.
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